HHS/ED/PS COMM #1
February 11, 2016

MEMORANDUM

February 9, 2016

TO: Health and Human Services Committee
Education Committee
Public Safety Committee

FROM: Linda McMillan, Senior Legislative Analyst
Essie McGuire, Senior Legislative Analyst

SUBJECT: **Children Fleeing Violence**

Presenters at this session:
Dr. Cynthia Arnson, Director, Latin American Program, Wilson Center
Dr. Mark Hugo Lopez, Director of Hispanic Research, Pew Research Center
Sonia Umanzor, Deputy Chief of Community Affairs, Embassy of El Salvador
Diego Uriburu, Executive Director, Identity
Julian Labiche, Senior Program Officer, and Carmen Centeno, Program Officer, Liberty's Promise

The Health and Human Services (HHS) Committee and Education (ED) Committee have held previous joint sessions to discuss the trends and service needs regarding children fleeing violence from Central America (these children may also be referred to as unaccompanied minors depending on their status). The discussions have touched on the increased need for health and mental health services, school resources for children who do not speak English or do not speak English as a first language, school-based support systems such as Linkages to Learning and programs that address basic needs, and community-based support systems that provide social and educational support and positive youth development activities.

At this session, the joint HHS, ED, and Public Safety (PS) Committee will hear from experts about the history that has led to the current criminal and economic circumstances that are particularly bad in El Salvador and are causing families to send their children to the United States. The joint HHS and ED Committee agreed at its last session, that it is critical to understand this history in order to understand the trauma these young people have faced and the circumstances that lead some young people to become involved with gangs. This will prepare the joint HHS, ED, and PS Committee for future discussions that have been requested about how to build capacity for support programs and how to address public safety issues including gang

recruitment in schools and the community. At this session the joint Committee will also hear from two community-based programs, Identity and Liberty's Promise about the work they do and the needs they see when working with these young people.

Background Information

Attached as background information for this session are:

July 17, 2014 testimony from Dr. Arnson to the United States Senate's Committee on Foreign Relations, "Dangerous Passage: Central America in Crisis and the Exodus of Unaccompanied Minors." (©1-7)

Wilson Center Brief, "Four questions and observations about El Salvador's deteriorating security system," by Eric Olson and Katherine Hyde. (©8-16)

July 22, 2014 Pew Research Center brief, "Children 12 and under are fastest growing group of unaccompanied minors at U.S. border," by Jens Manuel Krogstad, Ana Gonzolez-Barrera, and Mark Hugo Lopez. (©17-19)

Overview of Identity's Programs and Services, noting that over 4,000 people were served in FY14. Identity's vision is that "Latino youth and their families are empowered to foster a just and equitable society that nurtures all youth and is enriched by their contributions." (©20-21)

November 5, 2015 testimony to the joint HHS and ED Committee from Candace Kattar, Senior Program Director, Identity. Time did not allow Ms. Kattar to provide her comments to the joint Committee at its last session. (©22-27)

Overview information from Liberty's Promise. Through three core programs, Civics and Citizenship, a civic education program, Civic Engagement for Beginning English Language Learners (CE-BELL), a Spanish-language civics program for newly arrived Hispanic students, and Opportunities Plus, an internship program, Liberty's Promise provides positive experiences for low-income immigrants between the ages of 15 and 21 by introducing them to our democratic traditions and facilitating their transition to American life. (©28-30)

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Testimony by Cynthia J. Arnson

Director, Latin American Program

Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

Before the Committee on Foreign Relations

United States Senate

"Dangerous Passage: Central America in Crisis

And the Exodus of Unaccompanied Minors"[1]

July 17, 2014

Chairman Menendez, Senator Corker, and Distinguished Members of the Committee,

As someone who has closely followed Central American affairs for over three decades, I am pleased to have this opportunity to testify on the surge of unaccompanied minors arriving at the U.S. border from Central America.

As our nation seeks to address this unprecedented influx, we must humanely and intelligently respond both to immediate needs and address longer-term perspectives. In the short term, our response must ensure that, in accordance with U.S. and international law, those in need of protection as victims of human trafficking and/or those with legitimate claims for asylum are afforded timely due process; that is, that they are assisted and not penalized. This principle is important to keep in mind in light of the pressures to remove children quickly, given the current size of the influx as well as to send a strong message in an effort to deter further migration.

My testimony will address three of the most important drivers of this flow, and suggest options for improving the quality of democratic governance, citizen security, and inclusive development

[1] I am grateful to Latin American Program interns Kathryn Moffat, Angela Budzinski, and Carla Mavaddat for research assistance.

in Central America. Indeed, a long-term solution to what is now a humanitarian crisis rests on these three pillars—what the U.S. government is prepared to commit over the long-term in pursuit of these goals, and what responsibility Central American actors in and out of government are willing to assume to transform their own countries.

There is no one causal factor that accounts for the unprecedented increase in unaccompanied children attempting to enter the United States, or the lesser but still significant increase in the number of adults attempting to enter with young children. The numbers of young children seeking to enter spiked in this fiscal year after smaller but significant increases in the past two years.[2] Children from Nicaragua, Panama, and Costa Rica are, for the most part, not part of this increase. This begs a closer exploration as to why such large numbers are arriving from El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala—the so-called Northern Triangle. In general, the "push" factors behind this flow stem from the persistent failure of governments following the internal armed conflicts of the 1970s, '80s, and '90s, to guarantee the security of their citizens or provide a foundation for broad-based socio-economic well-being.[3] These twin failures have given rise to a cluster of factors that can be summarized as follows:

Criminal and Drug-Fueled Violence: Central America's Northern Triangle (El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras) has been described with numbing regularity as the most violent region in the world outside countries at war. The staggering rates of homicide[4] take their largest toll on young men between the ages of 15 and 29, although young women have been increasingly targeted. Annual homicide statistics, as revealing as they are, tell only part of the story. For example, the homicide rate in El Salvador declined due to a controversial truce between the country's two most important gangs. However, some parts of the country saw a rise in murders during the gang truce, reinforcing the point that crime rates *within* a country's borders vary significantly, between urban and rural areas, from city to city, and—within cities—from neighborhood to neighborhood.[5] Hence, a decline in the national average, as has occurred in Guatemala over the past several years, does not necessarily eliminate "hot zones" with high murder rates. Indeed, a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) study of unaccompanied minors attempting to enter the United States between January and May 2014 found that the largest number by far came from Honduras. Twenty of the 30 top sending cities and towns were Honduran, led by San Pedro Sula, the most violent city in the world.[6] As noted by DHS,

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[2] The number of Salvadorans, Guatemalans, and Hondurans requesting political asylum in Belize, Costa Rica, Mexico, and Panama, also increased significantly.

[3] See Cynthia Arnson, ed., *In the Wake of War: Democratization and Internal Armed Conflict in Latin America* (Washington, D.C. and Stanford, CA: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Stanford University Press, 2012).

[4] The rates are 41.2 per 100,000 in El Salvador, 39.9 per 100,000 in Guatemala, and 90.4 per 100,000, according to 2012 figures of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.

[5] See United Nations Development Program, *Informe Regional de Desarrollo Humano: Seguridad Ciudadana con rostro humano: diagnóstico y propuestas para América Latina* (New York: 2013).

[6] The top cities in terms of places of origin of unaccompanied minors were: San Pedro Sula, Tegucigalpa, and Juticalpa, Honduras; followed by San Salvador, El Salvador; La Ceiba, Honduras; and Guatemala City.

"Salvadoran and Honduran children…come from extremely violent regions where they probably perceive the risk of traveling alone to the US preferable to remaining at home."[7]

Moreover, excessive focus on homicides, while understandable, does not capture the many forms of street crime, threats, assault, kidnapping, sexual violence, and extortion that affect citizens on a routine and intimate basis. Many statistics are unreliable as civilians do not trust the police or other authorities, leading to significant underreporting of even serious crimes.

Gangs or *maras* are not solely responsible for the levels of violent crime in the Northern Triangle, but their role is pervasive and highly organized. In post-war Central America, numerous factors contributed to the rise of gangs—migration to the United States, which divided families; a lack of opportunity; a culture of violence; access to firearms; an absence of social capital; rapid urbanization, etc.[8] U.S. deportations of gang members convicted of crimes in the United States, for years with little or no advance warning to government officials in the region, contributed to the diffusion of gang culture and practices. Zero-tolerance or *mano dura* policies adopted by the governments of El Salvador and Honduras, in particular, only made matters worse; these policies reinforced gang solidarity and membership as a form of protection from the state and led to prison overcrowding and the role of prisons as incubators of gang membership. All this took place against a backdrop of incomplete and at times distorted processes of building and reforming civilian security and law enforcement institutions after the end of civil wars. Impunity and corruption remain rampant.

Crime and violence, including that perpetrated by gangs, have worsened as drug trafficking and other forms of organized crime have spread in the Northern Triangle. However, the crisis of insecurity long predates the spillover of Mexican drug trafficking cartels such as the Zetas or Sinaloa into Central America. U.S. demand for drugs has served to deepen the security crisis, as has the failure to restrict the flow of firearms from the United States into Mexico and Central America. Weak institutions and some corrupt officials in those countries have permitted organized crime to flourish.

Poverty and Lack of Opportunity

Poverty by itself is not a good predictor of who will migrate and when, but a general lack of opportunity, particularly when coupled by high levels of violence in poor neighborhoods, creates an important push factor for those who are willing to risk their lives in order to enter the United States. Poverty levels in the Northern Triangle have gone down since the 1990s, but it is still the case that poverty affects approximately 45 percent of Salvadorans, 54.8 percent of Guatemalans,

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[7] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Homeland Intelligence Today: Unaccompanied Alien Children (UACs) by Location of Origin for CY 2014: Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala," May 27, 2014.

[8] José Miguel Cruz, Rafael Fernández de Castro, and Gema Santamaría Balmaceda, "Political Transition, Social Violence, and Gangs: Cases in Central America and Mexico," in Arnson, ed., *In the Wake of War*, 317-49. Analysts such as Douglas Farah also point to the failure of post-war demobilization and reintegration schemes as a factor behind the rise of gangs. See Douglas Farah, "Organized Crime in El Salvador: Its Homegrown and Transnational Dimension," in Cynthia J. Arnson and Eric L. Olson, eds., *Organized Crime in Central America: The Northern Triangle* (Washington, D.C.: Latin American Program, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2011), 104-38.

and 67.4 percent of Hondurans. In Guatemala and Honduras, over half of those in poverty are classified as indigent, that is, in extreme poverty.[9] According to the World Food Program, in Guatemala alone, approximately half of children ages 5 and under suffer from chronic under-nutrition. Rural poverty in general is far worse than in urban areas. Growth rates in the three countries vary; all three economies suffered severe impacts as a result of the 2008 global financial crisis and for the most part, recovery has been mediocre.

One striking indicator of the lack of opportunity is the proportion of 15 to 24-year-olds who neither study nor work. Known by the Spanish acronym "Ni-Ni," they constitute 23.9 percent of youth in this age group in El Salvador, 22.6 percent in Guatemala, and 28.0 percent in Honduras. Many young women in this category help take care of households. Of young people 15-24 years of age who have work, low levels of education prevail. More than 60 percent of Guatemalans and Hondurans in this age group have left school before completing 9th grade. The same is true for approximately 48 percent of Salvadorans.[10]

Northern Triangle countries are also characterized by high levels of inequality of opportunity. Indicators such as the Gini coefficient and the United Nations Development Program's Inequality Adjusted Human Development Index demonstrate that inequality is pervasive in the region.[11]

Family Reunification

Migration flows from Central America into the United States increased in a significant way during the civil wars of the 1980s. Many of those entering the United States from El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Honduras were granted Temporary Protected Status. This designation has been renewed repeatedly long after the wars have ended and has been applied to new groups of migrants following natural disasters such as earthquakes and hurricanes, including Hurricane Mitch. Renewals of TPS have been carried out in response to requests from Central American governments who argue that a return of large numbers of migrants would be destabilizing given a lack of opportunities in the labor market. I am unaware of information that specifically links adults with TPS or Green Cards to the flow of undocumented children. But special consideration should be given to family reunification for Central American migrants who have legal status in the United States.

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[9] UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, *Social Panorama of Latin America* (Santiago: 2013). See also: Hugo Beteta, "Central American Development: Two Decades of Progress and Challenges for the Future," Regional Migration Study Group, Woodrow Wilson Center and Migration Policy Institute, July 2012, 8.

[10] Figures concerning the Ni-Ni's are drawn from Programa Estado de la Nación, "Nini en Centroamérica: la población de 15 a 24 años que no estudia ni trabaja," presentation at the INCAE and Woodrow Wilson Center conference "Encuentro de Diálogo en Temas de Seguridad Centroamericana," Managua, Nicaragua, March 24, 2014.

[11] See Dinorah Azpuru, "Las condiciones del Triángulo Norte y los menores migrantes", *ConDistintosAcentos*, Universidad de Salamanca, Spain, July 14, 2014.

According to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, of the 11.4 million unauthorized immigrants in the United States in 2012, the number of undocumented Salvadorans, Guatemalans, and Hondurans in the United States were 690,000, 560,000, and 360,000, respectively. Often working in menial jobs, they have nonetheless managed to support family members back home through remittance flows. Remittances have boosted incomes and consumption in Central America, often substituting for, or at a minimum, supplementing weak social safety nets. Remittances constitute fully 17 percent of GDP in El Salvador and 20 percent in Honduras. What these figures demonstrate is that divided families in Central America are critical to the economic well-being of their relatives as well as to their countries' economies overall. The human dimensions of this phenomenon should not be overlooked. This is especially true given that migration and the strains it places on separated families are seen as risk factors for young people joining gangs.

Reporters' interviews with young migrants as well as adults who care for them suggest that the desire of parents and children to be reunited is a push as well as pull factor behind the current flows. There is circumstantial evidence that rumors have spread in communities in the region—stoked by unscrupulous and often brutal traffickers (*coyotes*) anxious to profit from the thousands of dollars each migrant pays—indicating that children will be reunited with their parents and allowed to stay in the United States once they reach the U.S. border. The Obama administration has recently begun publicity campaigns to counter these misperceptions. Even if perceptions can be altered, however, they will do little to curb the desperation that motivates young children and others to embark on a perilous and often fatal journey.

Policy Responses

One thin silver lining in the crisis of undocumented minors is that it has focused renewed attention on the violence, poverty, and hopelessness that affect millions of Central American citizens. Indeed, I can recall no time since the Central American wars of the 1980s when so much U.S. media and policy attention has been paid to the region. Our failure to invest and remain engaged in Central America in the peacetime era, with the same resources and single-mindedness with which we fought the Cold War, has no doubt contributed to the current situation. The Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), launched in 2008 in response to concerns about the spillover of organized crime from Mexico, has focused on security without setting other governance and development objectives as priorities. CARSI has also been under-resourced. This situation needs to change.

There is no magic bullet to address these problems, which have taken decades if not centuries to develop. But progress is possible, with the right leadership, sufficient resources, active civic participation, integral approaches, and adherence to the principles of transparency and accountability. A critical ingredient for policies to be successful is political will and leadership from the region itself. Yet history has shown that the United States still wields tremendous influence and should not hesitate to exercise it on behalf of shared objectives.

In the short run, the current crisis should be handled in ways that protect vulnerable children, many of whom have been traumatized in their home countries or during their journey to the U.S.

border. Indeed, humanitarian workers receive frequent reports of trafficking for sexual exploitation or slave labor, as well as of organ trafficking, kidnappings, and brutal killings. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimates that 58 percent of unaccompanied minors have legitimate claims under U.S. and humanitarian law.

Of the current funding request pending before Congress, far too little is to be made available for addressing the root causes of migration in Central America. The $295 million included to address "economic, social, governance, and citizen security conditions" is also to be used for the repatriation and reintegration of migrants in Central America. Once these purposes are accomplished, it is unclear how much will be left to meet the significant challenges in remaining areas.

The following suggestions are intended to spur broader thinking about a comprehensive, long-term approach:

- Transparency and accountability around new spending programs must be core commitments upheld by recipients in the region of U.S. and other international assistance. Corruption erodes trust and fosters cynicism across societies and undermines the legitimacy of government institutions. Building institutional capacity and effectiveness means gaining the confidence of citizens across the board. Leaders of key institutions should not serve unless they are models of these principles.
- Future policy initiatives should, as much as possible, be the outcome of broad-based national dialogues in Central America among a range of stakeholders—government representatives; the private sector, business, and professional associations; the Church; think tanks and universities; organized labor; non-profit organizations; *campesino* organizations. The forums, with the involvement of other donors and international development banks, should be convened for the purpose of devising concrete proposals for fostering security, governance, and inclusive development.
- Improving citizen security—a public good—is a necessary condition for fostering investment and economic growth. U.S. assistance programs under CARSI have been overly focused on counter-drug operations and combatting other forms of organized crime. A "whole of government" approach has purported to coordinate development and violence prevention strategies with improved law enforcement and interdiction. But in practice, development goals have been secondary and the security programs not sufficiently focused on fighting the crime and violence that affect citizens' daily lives.[12] The greatest examples of success in Latin America in improving citizen security involve local, community-based initiatives that involve non-governmental organizations, the private sector, and other civic groups in addition to the police and judiciary.
- While security is paramount, other development and governance efforts must go forward in parallel fashion. Efforts must be made to foster opportunity in the legal economy by investing in human capital formation that matches education and job training with the demands of the labor market, including through strategic investment with a training component. Ensuring the reliability of a legal framework that creates certainty for

[12] Andrew Selee, Cynthia J. Arnson, and Eric L. Olson, "Crime and Violence in Mexico and Central America: An Evolving but Incomplete U.S. Policy Response," Regional Migration Study Group, Wilson Center and Migration Policy Institute, January 2013.

investors without ignoring the needs of ordinary citizens for whom the judicial system does not function is paramount.

- More must be done to improve the capacity of remittances to contribute to productive investment in communities, in addition to subsidizing household consumption.
- Investments must be made to expand quality public education, including by stimulating U.S. community colleges and vocational and trade schools to partner with underserved communities in Central America. Part of these exchanges should be aimed at improving teacher training.

No lasting solution to the current crisis will be found "on the cheap" or in the short run. In the current U.S. fiscal climate, only smart investments that derive from a strategic logic will survive the political process now and into the future. As the example of Colombia demonstrates, a major turnaround in a country's fortunes is possible when bipartisan majorities in the United States provide sustained support to committed leaders in and out of government who mobilize their country's own talent and resources. Central Americans came together with the support of the international community to end their fratricidal wars two decades ago. A similar effort is needed to convert the current crisis into an opportunity for building more inclusive and democratic societies.

Thank you again for this opportunity to share my thoughts.

Wilson Center

LATIN AMERICAN PROGRAM

Four questions and observations about El Salvador's deteriorating security situation

By Eric L. Olson and Katherine Hyde

El Salvador has become the most violent place on earth. The country's security situation has dramatically deteriorated in recent months, with homicide rates skyrocketing over the summer to levels unseen since the country's civil war. The wave of violence peaked in August, with over 900 homicides in one month. The homicide rate for 2015 will almost certainly exceed 100 per 100,000 individuals, compared to 68.6 in 2014 and 43.7 in 2013, according to El Salvador's Institute of Legal Medicine (IML) and National Civil Police (PNC).

Though it remains unclear whether criminal gangs, transnational organized crime, the government's own tactics[1], or other actors are driving the violence, the government continues to state that a majority of the homicides result from in-fighting between the Mara Salvatrucha and Barrio 18 gangs. A recently-published report from El Salvador's Attorney General attributes 65 percent of homicides to the gangs, despite police evidence that the number might be 35 percent.[2]

[1]David Morales, the head of El Salvador's Attorney General's Office of Human Rights (PDDH), recently announced that 92 percent of the 2,202 complaints of human rights abuse received between June 2014 and May 2015 were against the National Civil Police. http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/reported-abuses-by-el-salvador-security-forces-up-official

[2] As Salvador's newspaper *El Diario de Hoy* pointed out in a recent article, this claim is dubious and has even been refuted by police statistics. According to statistics from the PNC, between 2014 and the middle of September 2015, only 32 percent of homicide victims had links to the gangs. This figure could indicate that other actors such as organized crime are contributing to the spike in violence, or that police investigations are insufficient to establish links between the victims and the gangs.

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Regardless of who is behind this unprecedented uptick in violence, the state has struggled to gain control of the situation. Though the government of President Salvador Sánchez Cerén has recently launched *El Salvador Seguro* (Secure El Salvador), an ambitious security plan emphasizing prevention and rehabilitation, its implementation has been overshadowed by the uptick in violence and a subsequent return to repressive security measures. Thus, despite the *de jure* policy of prevention and rehabilitation, the *de facto* policy has prioritized direct confrontation with the gangs using police and military forces. These confrontations have in turn led to large-scale indiscriminate arrests, which have been proven to do little to stem the violence.

The skyrocketing violence has serious consequences for migration, economic growth, governance, and Salvadoran democracy itself. Though the number of homicides has eased off its high from last summer, violence remains unacceptably high and the gangs and the state remain locked in a stalemate with no end in sight. Here, we examine how this situation arose, the government's response, and prospects for the future.

1. The failure of the 2012 gang truce heavily influenced the current situation

To understand why violence has escalated in El Salvador, we have to return to March 2012 when a truce was signed between the Mara Salvatrucha and Barrio 18 leadership, with the tacit support of the Salvadoran government, then led by President Mauricio Funes. The truce emerged when the Funes government, understandably anxious to lower a ballooning homicide rate, engaged in dialogue with gang leaders through trusted mediators. The dialogue led to an agreement and eventually a *de facto* truce when the government transferred gang leaders from maximum security prisons to lower-security facilities. This was done ostensibly so gang

leadership could enforce the truce. While the truce initially cut homicides by half, it did not stem extortions and other criminal activities and thus remained largely unpopular among many Salvadorans. Secretive negotiations with gang leaders and the widespread belief that the government had offered benefits to imprisoned gang leaders in exchange for a reduction in homicides undermined the public's trust in the truce. By the end of its first year in March 2013, more than half of Salvadorans had a negative opinion of the truce, even though the homicide rate remained comparatively low. By the end of its second year in March 2014, most experts and Salvadorans agreed that the truce was dead. It should also be noted that during this time U.S. policy was strongly and vocally opposed to the truce.

While the truce experiment enjoyed a short period of surprising success, it lacked a sustainable foundation and ultimately opened the possibility for the astronomical levels of violence today. The truce was negotiated from a place of desperation on the part of the Funes government, leaving some with the impression that gangs could use violence as a potent political tool to force the government into negotiations. For many, the truce implied that the gangs had gained recognition as legitimate political actors whose greatest negotiating leverage came from the violence they could unleash. In this view, once the gangs created enough chaos, the government would make concessions, including transferring gang leaders to lower security prisons and allegedly even paying them to maintain the truce. When the truce faltered and later collapsed, the gangs would use the political capital the truce had given them to attempt to force the government back to the table.

2. The return to repressive policies has exacerbated the situation

President Sánchez (who is from the same left-of-center political party (FMLN) as Funes), took office in June 2014 promising a different approach to the gangs than his predecessor. In January 2015 he clarified that he would not pursue further negotiations with the gangs. Instead, he decided to pursue a starkly different policy of confrontation with the gangs that has inevitably off a cycle of escalation and brinkmanship between the gangs and the state.

The government sent gang leaders back to maximum security prison in mid-January. Around the same time, government rhetoric began emphasizing "going to war"[3] with the gangs, a stark departure from the dialogue President Funes had supported. The director of the PNC, Mauricio Landaverde, underscored this shift when he said that "All members of the PNC that have to use weapons against criminals due to their work as officers should do so with complete confidence. The PNC and the government will protect them." Accompanying this shift in language was an uptick in extrajudicial killings, some attributed to death squads and others attributed to the police forces themselves. Around the same time, the gangs began targeting law enforcement personnel and have killed over 50 police officers and 16 soldiers so far this year. In May, the President sent 600 additional soldiers in three military battalions to patrol the streets alongside the police, further exacerbating the atmosphere of militarization in the country.[4] In July, the gangs responded by enforcing a public transportation strike that paralyzed the streets of San Salvador. In August, the Salvadoran Supreme Court approved a law labeling the gangs as

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[3] PNC official Ricardo Salvador Martinez remarked in February 2015 that, "We're at war. And in this war, the criminals are beating us." www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/el-salvador-police-at-war-with-gangs

[4] One of the FMLN's priorities and accomplishments in negotiations leading to the 1992 Peace Accords ending the country's civil war was the establishment of a civilian police force and the separation of the military from public security functions. The reinsertion of the military into police roles under an FMLN President has struck some as ironic.

well as their "collaborators, apologists, and financiers" as terrorists, permitting longer prison sentences and lessening the burden of proof in criminal cases.

The new terrorist designation has facilitated more aggressive government crackdowns on suspected gangs. Joint police-military units have conducted indiscriminate arrests of as many as 200 youth at once for alleged "acts of terrorism."[5] In many cases, those arrested are later released or remain in pre-trail detention for an extended period of time.[6]

Though aggressive policies such as those described above do little to dismantle the gangs in the long term, they remain politically popular with Salvadorans who are eager to see a government "do something" to fight the gangs. According to a recent poll by Salvadoran newspaper *La Prensa Gráfica*, 72.1 percent of Salvadorans believe that insecurity is the principal problem facing the country, up over 10 percent from 2014. Given such high levels of concern with insecurity, arrests of hundreds of individuals may appear more impressive than a targeted arrest of a single gang leader. These massive arrests give off the impression of a government that is winning the "war against the gangs" despite the fact that government and police leadership itself has acknowledged that repression alone is not an effective long-term strategy.[7] Such policies simply grab low-hanging fruit while doing little to tackle gang leadership or prevent, rehabilitate, and reinsert existing gang members.

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[5] Capturan a 231 pandilleros en Apopa durante baile: http://www.laprensagrafica.com/2015/09/27/capturan-a-231-pandilleros-en-apopa-durante-baile

[6] According to a 2014 report by the Open Society Justice Initiative, El Salvador is ranked tenth in the world for the number of pre-trial detainees per 100,000 of the general population, with a rate of 107.5. https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/presumption-guilt-09032014.pdf

[7] In a recent conference in Madrid, Salvadoran Security Minister Benito Lara criticized *Mano Dura* (Iron Fist) policies, saying they "have not provided results."

3. The government is also pursuing an ambitious prevention and rehabilitation plan

While hardline security measures have dominated the government's policy toward gang violence this year, the government has also developed an ambitious plan prioritizing prevention, rehabilitation, and reinsertion. The government recently launched *El Salvador Seguro* (Secure El Salvador), a multi-year, $2.1 billion dollar plan to tackle citizen security issues. The ambitious plan, developed by the National Council on Citizen Security and Coexistence (CNSCC) includes an action plan with 124 recommendations to improve the security climate. Violence prevention is the centerpiece and will receive nearly 75 percent of the plan's funds if fully implemented and funded. A second component of this plan is a proposed reinsertion law which offers educational opportunities, job creation, and drug addiction therapy for gang members who have not committed serious crimes and are willing to renounce their gang affiliation. This law is currently under consideration in the Legislative Assembly's Security Commission.

The question of course remains whether or not the government will be able to pay for such an ambitious plan. Though the government has taken important steps to fund the *El Salvador Seguro* plan, they are still far away from their $2.1 billion goal. In recent months the government acquired $100 million in loans to support these programs and passed a new 5 percent telecommunications tax intended to defray the plan's costs. President Sánchez has also suggested that he hopes the United States will contribute, along with various state institutions, the private sector, and individual donors. Nevertheless, with a gang population of more than 60,000, according to 2012 estimates by the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, it will be a

challenge to come up with enough money to implement the rehabilitation law, not to mention the $2.1 billion needed for *El Salvador Seguro*.

In addition to *El Salvador Seguro*, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has funded a number of community-based prevention strategies as a part of the Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI).[8] Specific programs, with funding totaling more than $88.2 million from 2012 to 2018, include 118 community youth centers, vocational training in 55 municipalities, youth and family workshops in conflict prevention, and 25 victims' assistance centers that in 2014 alone helped more than 10,000 victims of gender-based violence. This prevention work, which crosses multiple sectors in education, economic growth, employment, public health, and governance, has had a demonstrated impact in reducing crime and increasing citizens' sense of security.[9] Furthermore, these programs represent the majority of U.S. security assistance to El Salvador. In 2015, the United States spent nearly $3 on humanitarian and development aid to every $1 spent on military and police aid.[10]

4. The situation is bleak, and there is no foreseeable end to the violence

Despite the positive impacts of many USAID funded prevention programs and the potential positive impact of a fully funded and implemented *El Salvador Seguro* program, the

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[8] See the attached PDF on www.wilsoncenter.org labeled "USAID Fact Sheets"

[9] A 2014 study by the Latin American Public Opinion Project showed that the CARSI prevention programs in the Northern Triangle countries have been successful: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/carsi-study.php

[10] This figure does not include aid provided by the Pentagon or the Drug Enforcement Administration, which are not under the same obligations to publish how much money they provide to foreign governments. http://securityassistance.org/el-salvador

security situation in El Salvador is bleak. Neither the gangs nor the government is prepared to concede, and further escalation seems likely. Efforts at prevention and rehabilitation, encouraging as they might be, continue to be overshadowed by shocking levels of violence and the bellicose rhetoric of "war" favored by the Salvadoran government. Efforts at creating rehabilitation and reinsertion programs are well intentioned but will fail without adequate financial support from the international community. While the number of homicides may be declining somewhat, the wave of insecurity does not appear to be abating and will continue to pose an immense challenge to the Salvadoran people and their government in 2016.

What is the way forward amidst such violence? We offer two suggestions, neither of which is easy to accomplish. First, some form of dialogue between the government and the gangs is becoming increasingly necessary. A formal negotiation or truce may be unrealistic and politically unpalatable to most Salvadorans, but it is increasingly apparent that the government's heavy-handed repressive strategies are only producing more casualties and are unlikely to lead to an unconditional surrender by the gangs. Someone within the government has to demonstrate the courage to begin a dialogue that can reduce the violence and open an opportunity for other more constructive approaches to take root.

The more constructive approaches such as working directly in youth prevention and rehabilitation are already included in the government's *Salvador Seguro* plan. USAID has been at the forefront of this work, but their efforts and those by members of the Salvadoran government have not been given an opportunity to take root and flourish in high crime areas

where the iron fist is the predominate approach. It is time for this type of work to become a priority if El Salvador is to avoid another bloody year like 2015.

PewResearchCenter

JULY 22, 2014

Children 12 and under are fastest growing group of unaccompanied minors at U.S. border

BY JENS MANUEL KROGSTAD (HTTP://WWW.PEWRESEARCH.ORG/AUTHOR/JKROGSTAD/) , ANA GONZALEZ-BARRERA (HTTP://WWW.PEWRESEARCH.ORG/AUTHOR/AGONZALEZBARRERA/) AND MARK HUGO LOPEZ (HTTP://WWW.PEWRESEARCH.ORG/STAFF/MARK-HUGO-LOPEZ/)

Crossing the U.S.-Mexico Border, Without Parents, at Increasingly Younger Ages

Total apprehensions of unaccompanied minors at the border



Apprehensions of unaccompanied minors at the border, by age



Note: Fiscal Year 2013 is Oct. 1, 2012 - Sept. 30, 2013. *Fiscal Year 2014 data is Oct. 1, 2013 - May 31, 2014.
Source: Pew Research Center analysis of U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Enforcement Integrated Database records

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

As the number of unaccompanied children trying to cross the U.S.-Mexico border has surged, the increase in apprehensions among children ages 12 and younger has been far greater than among teens, according to a Pew Research Center analysis of previously unreleased government data.

The new data show a 117% increase in the number of unaccompanied children ages 12 and younger caught at the U.S.-Mexico border this fiscal year compared with last fiscal year. By comparison, the number of apprehensions of unaccompanied teenagers ages 13-17 has increased by only 12% over the same time period.

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Even though the growth is higher among younger children, the bulk of unaccompanied children caught at the border remain teenagers. In fiscal year 2013, nine-in-ten minors apprehended at the border were teens. This share has dropped as the number of younger children making the dangerous trip has risen dramatically: In the first eight months of fiscal year 2014, 84% were teens.

The new figures, obtained through a Freedom of Information Act request by the Pew Research Center, provide the first publicly available detailed portrait of the age and home country of child migrants—unaccompanied and accompanied– caught at the U.S.-Mexico border from Oct. 1, 2012, to May 31, 2014. The time period covers the previous fiscal year and two-thirds (8 months) of the current one.

Federal and state officials are scrambling to address the record number (http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/06/10/number-of-latino-children-caught-trying-to-enter-u-s-nearly-doubles-in-less-than-a-year/) of unaccompanied minors (those traveling without a parent or guardian) apprehended at the U.S.-Mexico border in recent months, which has surged by tens of thousands. Media reports have described (http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/08/us/child-migrants-strain-makeshift-arizona-shelter.html) hundreds of children packed into holding facilities in Texas and across the Southwest, sleeping with thermal blankets and overwhelming the U.S. Border Patrol. President Obama has requested $3.7 billion (http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/09/us/obama-seeks-billions-for-children-immigration-crisis.html) to respond to what he has called a "humanitarian crisis (http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/17/us/politics/border-crisis-casts-shadow-over-obamas-immigration-plan.html) ," and some Republican lawmakers are readying their own bills (http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/boehner-doubtful-congress-will-approve-border-funding-request-before-august-break/2014/07/17/534e2e0a-0dd3-11e4-b8e5-d0de80767fc2_story.html) .

From October through the end of May, 46,932 unaccompanied children, nearly all from Mexico and Central America, were taken into custody, according to data obtained from U.S. Customs and Border Protection. Recently released figures (http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/southwest-border-unaccompanied-children) show that by the end of June, that number had risen to 57,525.

By comparison, 38,759 children were apprehended all of last fiscal year ending Sept. 30, 2013.

The dramatic increase in children traveling to the U.S. without their parents from Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala, is largely the result of high rates of poverty and violence (http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/07/01/dhs-violence-poverty-is-driving-children-to-flee-central-america-to-u-s/) in their home countries, according to U.S. Department of Homeland Security documents. Gang and drug trafficking violence had driven Honduras's murder rate to 90 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants (http://www.unodc.org/gsh/en/data.html) in 2012, the highest in the world. In El Salvador, the murder rate (41 per 100,000 in 2012) trails only Honduras, Venezuela and Belize.

When looking at the data by country, a larger share of Honduran unaccompanied minors are younger than 12, compared with those from other countries. More than one-in-four (27%) apprehended Honduran children were ages 12 and under in fiscal year 2014, up from 20% the previous year.

El Salvador ranks second in the share of minors apprehended at the border who are 12 years and younger, with the share increasing from 17% to 22% over the same time period. Among those from Guatemala, the share of minors apprehended at the border who are ages 12 and under has doubled to 10%. By contrast, just 3% of apprehensions of Mexican minors were young children during both fiscal years. Mexico's apprehensions in fiscal year 2014 so far have not yet exceeded the previous year.

(18)

Among all countries, less than 1% (94 cases) of apprehended unaccompanied children are younger than 1, and only about 2% (785) are 5 or younger, according to data for the current fiscal year. Children ages 6 to 12 accounted for 14% (6,675) apprehensions. The U.S. categorizes children as "unaccompanied" if they are not traveling with a parent or guardian, although they may have traveled with another relative.

While the surge in unaccompanied children has received a lot of media attention, the number of apprehensions of children who are accompanied by a parent or guardian has increased at a far faster clip, nearly tripling (160% increase) in less than a year. In the partial fiscal year 2014 data provided, 22,069 accompanied children were apprehended, up from just 8,479 during all of the previous fiscal year.

Children who travel with a parent tended to be younger than those who travel without one. About eight-in-ten (81%) apprehended accompanied children were 12 years or younger, compared with just 16% of apprehended unaccompanied children, according to the 2014 data.

Among children apprehended at the border with a parent or guardian, Honduras again stands out as the top country of origin. Fiscal year 2014 data shows 12,074 accompanied Honduran children have been apprehended so far, a 434% increase over the previous year.

Honduras Sends Largest Number of Unaccompanied Young Children to U.S.

Apprehensions of unaccompanied minors on the U.S.-Mexico border, by country of origin



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Source: Pew Research Center analysis of U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Enforcement Integrated Database records

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identity

Serving Latino Youth and Their Families

To serve others is a privilege and requires excellence.

School-Based Programs

Youth Opportunity Centers
(Gang Prevention and Intervention)

Wellness Centers
Northwood , Gaithersburg and Watkins Mill High Schools

GED Preparation

Sports and Recreation

Mental Health Counseling

Re-entry and Rehabilitation Support

Volunteer Opportunities

Programs and Services

Identity served more than **4,000 clients** in FY14.

All programs are based on the Positive Youth Development model, and work to increase protective factors, such as self-esteem, conflict resolution skills, and self-efficacy levels—i.e., the factors that reduce young people's potential for engaging in negative behaviors. These programs also help reduce risk factors such as substance abuse, involvement in delinquent activities, and feeling disconnected from school—factors that can lead to negative outcomes. Identity's programs are supported by mental health and case management services.

More about our approach

Identity provides programs and services for Latino youth to help them achieve a sense of confidence, connection, and control over their future. We strive to create lasting improvements in their lives by providing educational opportunities focused on making healthy choices that enable a successful transition to post-secondary education and the workforce. The Positive Youth Development model is at the core of Identity's approach and constitutes the foundation of our programs.

Hallmarks of our programs consist of:

Research-based programming. We conduct extensive community-based needs assessments, which guide the design and content of our programs. This research also serves to educate policymakers on key issues facing the Latino population in the county.

Holistic Approach. The designs of our programs involve an integrated approach that allows youth participating in a specific program to access services from other programs. For instance, a GED participant may also receive career readiness training, participate in conflict resolution sessions, or be tested for HIV. In addition, all our programs incorporate a parent education component, as well as wraparound support to the youth and their families through case management services and mental health counseling.

Evaluation. Identity has developed rigorous data collection and evaluation methods for all our programs. We have designed several program- and site-specific tools and surveys to collect baseline and exit data, which are analyzed by an external evaluator. The assessment of the knowledge, attitudes, and behaviors of the youth is ongoing and used by Program Managers to determine emerging needs, monitor program effectiveness, and inform program design.

Identity's Staff. Our staff is bilingual and bicultural—approximately 80% are of Latino descent—and well-suited to serve our target population.

Multiplier Effect. Youth who participate in Identity's programs are not considered one-time participants in a specific activity, but become life-long members of our

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community. Identity provides them with a platform for continued engagement well beyond their participation in a specific program, such as involvement in volunteer, civic, and community service activities. This continued engagement broadens the multiplier effect of the programs providing continuity to their scope and objectives.

Clients Identity served in FY14 (July 2013 - June 2014), through the following programs:



About Us
Programs & Services
Who We Serve
Our Supporters
Opportunities
Give us your feedback
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Testimony

Provided to the Montgomery County Council's

Joint Meeting of the Education and Health and Human Services Committees

Unaccompanied / Minor Children Fleeing Violence

Candace Kattar

Identity

November 5, 2015

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Chairman Leventhal, Chairman Rice, and Members of the Council Standing Committees of Health and Human Services and Education,

We were asked to provide testimony regarding what services we feel are necessary for the children and families we are serving that have been fleeing the violence in Central America and Mexico. Thank you for this opportunity. Very concretely, we believe what is needed includes the following:

1) A dedicated, high-level coordinating body to develop a comprehensive approach to serving this community, to ensure service providers are communicating with each other (this includes DHHS, MCPS, Department of Recreation, and nonprofits) and that services are truly reaching the families in need. This coordinating body can report to your Committees on a regular basis.
2) Additional funds to those entities that are providing the immediate services needed by these youth and families, accompanied by appropriate oversight of this spending.
3) A commitment at the leadership level to integrate these young people into MCPS initiatives, county workforce initiatives such as *WorkSource*,

GED programs, mental health services, and out-of-school-time activities including those offered by the Department of Recreation.

As you are no doubt aware, the violence in Central America and Mexico has not abated. Consequently, the flow of children fleeing that violence, with or without family members, has also not diminished. What has changed is the militarization of the Mexican border with Guatemala, and Mexico's stepped up deportations of Central Americans attempting to cross through that country on their way to the US. This military response to a humanitarian crisis may have slowed the numbers of Central Americans reaching our borders, but it has not stopped that flow. Central American children and families will continue to reach the US but will have undergone an even more grueling and dangerous journey as they must now travel through more remote routes in an attempt to evade Mexican security forces.

You have received, in separate reports, some of the numbers of recently arrived youth served by many agencies last year as well as in this new fiscal year. It is important to note that the 81 recently arrived youth seen in Identity's two Youth Opportunity Centers and three Wellness Centers since July 2015, are on top of the more than 500 youth enrolled in our programs from January 2014 – June

2015. We are also serving an additional 40 recently arrived youth in our soccer program since July of this year. They represent 20% of all newly enrolled youth in our soccer program this year. Children fleeing violence are still children. Our soccer program provides them with an outlet to be just that – to be children. At the same time it is a way to encourage them in their structured school activities and connect them to their new communities. The numbers all of us continue to see requires a coordinating body to ensure accountability, share resources, and guarantee appropriateness of services.

Most children from these countries have experienced periods of interrupted formal education because the violence in their home countries prohibited them from attending school on a regular basis. We have 7th grade children in one program that do not know simple subtraction. These children are in need of remedial academic supports and social and emotional supports that MCPS programs are ill-equipped to handle alone. The children are often not prepared to adjust to the formality and discipline required by our educational system. These children need one-on-one mentoring. Many of the older children are in need of vocational training because they will not be graduating from our high schools. Without a connection to a realistic academic or career plan they are at very high risk of negative outcomes. There are also older youth being sent

here, victims of the gang violence, narco –trafficking, and corruption in their home countries, who are now victimizing others. These children need a more therapeutic approach to dealing with their trauma and behavior. While youth arrested at the border are placed in federal custody and then, if not deported, placed with sponsors, there are many youth that are arriving here undetected by federal officials. They too are being served by all of us.

The social and emotional support needed for these children and teens to deal with the trauma they have undergone, and for families to deal with a multitude of reunification issues, is well-documented and does not need repeating here. The range in their ages requires different programming options from multiple partners. What is clear is that there needs to be a concerted effort to integrate these young people into all of our programs. This mandate must come at the leadership level.

Identity, like many other nonprofits, has, and will continue to serve these children and their families. Unfortunately, most of us are serving this influx of high-need clients with no additional financial support. Our county contractual obligations, in every multi-year contract we have – the Youth Opportunity Centers, the Wellness Centers, and our Positive Youth Development program,

remain unchanged. The number of individuals we are required to serve each year, through those multi-year contracts, has not changed. The funding amounts we receive each year remains unchanged. Yet the growing numbers of families with these increased social, emotional and academic needs are much greater than those we have served in the past. This is true for Identity and for many other nonprofits. For this reason, additional funding is needed for all of us struggling to meet these increased demands.

We have been in a reactive mode for several years. We believe our three recommendations will put us on the road to a more comprehensive, planned, and appropriately financed response that will ensure these children are well served.

Thank you.

LIBERTY'S PROMISE

Investing in America's Immigrant Youth

OUR PROGRAMS

Since 2005, we've served 3,291 immigrant youth (ages 15-21) representing 105 countries through our three core programs:

Civics and Citizenship is our after-school civic engagement program. It is our largest program and **serves at least 320 immigrant youth annually** in the DC Metro Area and the City of Baltimore. The goal of the program is for youth to become civically engaged in their community, realizing they have an important role to play in our community. **The program increases youths' school attendance, engagement, and self-esteem.** This program is completely free for youth, and LP provides a meal for youth at each session and covers their transportation expenses. Since 2005, we have served 2,344 immigrant youth through this program.

CE-BELL, Civic Engagement for Beginning English- Language Learners(*CE-BELL*) is our newest after-school civics program. *CE-BELL* follows the format of *Civics and Citizenship*, but focuses on **youth who have no or very limited English language skills**, and includes an English language learning component. The program, **delivered entirely in Spanish**, exposes our newest immigrants to American civic life and encourages their involvement in their communities early on. In *CE-BELL*, youth meet successful immigrants who can inspire them, and participate in field trips, community service projects and hands-on activities to build a sense of belonging in their new country. Since 2013, we have served 314 youth through *CE-BELL*.

Opportunities Plus places low-income, documented, immigrant youth, ages 15-21, in six or eight week internships with local businesses, government agencies, and nonprofits. Prior to their internship placements, youth participate in a four-hour job skills workshop, where they develop a cover letter, resume, and interview skills. LP provides participants with a modest allowance to cover their food and transportation costs for what would traditionally be an unpaid internship. To date, **707 youth have gained professional skills, workplace knowledge, and confidence in their abilities** through this program.

Anything & Everything! We help our participants, and by extension their families, with literally anything and everything they need. We connect them to job opportunities, youth leadership programs, scholarship programs, financial aid programs, housing, legal, or tutoring services, volunteer opportunities and on and on. Whatever they need or request, we help find the answer for them, walking them through the system and giving them the reins to maneuver on their own. In this capacity, **we've provided an additional 647 services in just three years alone**.

Read about some of our success stories Want to know more? Check out our media section

LIBERTY'S PROMISE

Investing in America's Immigrant Youth

SUCCESS STORIES

"It's been hard for me to present the speakers because I'm kind of shy. Liberty's Promise has helped me to be more confident in myself."
– 16-year-old participant from El Salvador

Since we started work in August 2005, Liberty's Promise has served more than 2,800 young immigrants from 105 different countries through internships and civic education. We believe the experiences of our participants offer a compelling demonstration of our impact. Each one of our young immigrants has a story, and sometimes it is not a pretty one. We work with refugees from war-torn countries and asylees fleeing political persecution — young people who lost everything to civil strife. We also help youth born here to immigrant parents, young people whose parents cannot help them explore a career because they work multiple jobs to keep a roof over the family's head. We believe the best we can do is give these young people an opportunity — a chance to work, to learn about the civic life of their communities, and to achieve their American Dream. What follows is the path that some of our participants have taken to achieve those dreams

Read about some of our young people:

Beatriz	Jorge	Monica
Chanming	Joseph	
Faranha	Raul	

Want to know more? Check out what has been said about us in the media.

LINKS

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LIBERTY'S PROMISE
Investing in America's Immigrant Youth

Raul, 16 year-old from El Salvador



When we first met Raul, he seemed distant and shy. In fact on the first day of our civic education program, we found him sitting alone, away from the rest of the group. It wasn't long before we noticed a remarkable change. He went from quiet and withdrawn to engaged and confident. In fact, his self-esteem grew so much that he decided to participate in our internship program, despite saying that he wouldn't at the beginning of the program. Liberty's Promise was able to place him at the Montgomery County Senior Connection, an opportunity that would normally be unpaid and inaccessible. "He is such a delightful young man," said Sue Dollins, the Executive Director of the organization, "This has been a wonderful experience. I couldn't ask for a better candidate. This is a wonderful thing you are doing for nonprofits." This newly confident young man created all of the Senior Connection's Hispanic outreach and in the summer of 2008, he even created an advertisement for a local Latino newspaper.

Beatriz Jorge Monica

Chanming Joseph

Faranha Raul

LINKS

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