To the Honorable Members of the County Council of Montgomery County, MD

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From: Dr. Jack L. Rutner
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Re: Expedited Bill 21-22, Weapons – Firearms In or Near Places of Public Assembly

This purpose of this testimonial letter is to raise questions to the Montgomery County Council about the constitutionality of the proposed legislation embodied in Bill 21-22. This testimonial letter will cover three issues:

I. The guidance provided by the Supreme Court to the Courts in the Bruen decision in how to adjudicate Second Amendment cases henceforth;

II. The Supreme Court’s discussion on sensitive places;

III. The Supreme Court’s reference to D. Kopel & J. Greenlee, The “Sensitive Places” Doctrine, 13 Charleston L. Rev. 205 (2018), and Brief for Independent Institute as Amicus Curiae and how they would affect the constitutionality of Expedited Bill 21-22.

I: The Supreme Court in the Bruen decision (8: II) reviewed the two-step procedure Courts of Appeal have used since the Heller and McDonald decisions. The Court held that, that was one step too many. Specifically, the Court wrote:

In keeping with Heller, we hold that when the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct. To justify its regulation, the government may not simply posit that the regulation promotes an important interest. Rather, the government must demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. Only if a firearm regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition may a court conclude that the individual’s conduct falls outside the Second Amendment’s “unqualified command.” (My emphasis.)

The Court emphasizes this further when it writes (10: IIB):

the government must affirmatively prove that its firearms regulation is part of the historical tradition that delimits the outer bounds of the right to keep and bear arms.

On examining Expedited Bill 21-22 I find nowhere does it show how the proposed regulation expanding sensitive places to many places of public assembly falls within the scope of being consistent with “this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Absent such analysis Expedited Bill 21-22 appears to on infirm constitutional grounds. On this basis alone a legal challenge to the constitutionality of 21-22 will prove successful in the federal courts.

II. With regard to sensitive places, the Court discussed the issue of sensitive places. It wrote that expanding sensitive places to a large variety of places of public assembly is inconsistent with the
Second Amendment. In particular, it writes (22) about New York State’s view on sensitive places:

In [New York State’s] view, “sensitive places” where the government may lawfully disarm law-abiding citizens include all “places where people typically congregate and where law-enforcement and other public-safety professionals are presumptively available.” Brief for Respondents 34. It is true that people sometimes congregate in “sensitive places,” and it is likewise true that law enforcement professionals are usually presumptively available in those locations. But expanding the category of “sensitive places” simply to all places of public congregation that are not isolated from law enforcement defines the category of “sensitive places” far too broadly. Respondents’ argument would in effect exempt cities from the Second Amendment and would eviscerate the general right to publicly carry arms for self-defense that we discuss in detail below. (My emphasis.)

Expedited Bill 21-22 does precisely what the Court counseled governments not to do, which is to expand the category of sensitive places to almost all places of public congregation. According to the Court, that categorizes sensitive places far too broadly. Indeed, based on the Court’s language in Bruen, should the Council pass Expedited Bill 21-22, legal challenges to it would be successful because of the overly broad categorization of sensitive places. When that is coupled with the absence of analysis demonstrating that 21-22 is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation, then it would seem 21-22 is on very legally infirm constitutional grounds and will not be upheld in federal court.

III. The definition of public places in Expedited Bill 21-22 is derived from Bill 4-21. They are:

[A] place where the public may assemble, whether the place is publicly or privately owned, including a park; place of worship; school; library; recreational facility; hospital; community health center; long-term facility; or multipurpose exhibition facility, such as a fairgrounds or conference center. A place of public assembly includes all property associated with the place, such as a parking lot or grounds of a building.”

Most of those places in 4-21 do not fall within the purview of public places based on the current references in its discussion in Bruen (21) regarding sensitive places. There, it pointed to an article in Charleston Law Review from 2018 title the “Sensitive Places Doctrine” by Kopel and Greenlee (hereinafter, KG), and to the Amicus Curia Brief of the Independent Institute (hereinafter BII). Both documents discuss sensitive places while the latter provides guidance on “longstanding” laws regarding such places/

In the KG article, there is a useful summary of the sensitive place doctrine (287f.), some of which I quote here (with my emphasis):

Extensions by analogy to schools and government buildings. It is difficult to create a rationale for extending the “sensitive places” doctrine to places that are not schools or government buildings. As discussed above, there are few “longstanding” restrictions on other locations.

Given the thin historical record, one can only guess about what factors make places “sensitive.” Some of the guesses are: places where most persons therein are minors (K-12 schools), places that concentrate adversarial conflict and can generate passionately angry emotions (courthouses, legislatures, polling places), or buildings containing people at acute personal risk of being targets of assassination (many government buildings).

The answer cannot be that the places are crowded. Sometimes they are, but no more so than a busy downtown sidewalk, and sidewalks are not sensitive places.
Rather than try to figure out analogies to “schools and government buildings,” the better judicial approach for other locations is simply to give the government the opportunity to prove its case under heightened scrutiny.

**Buffer zones are not sensitive places.** Heller allows for carry bans “in” sensitive places—not bans “around” or “near” sensitive places. Accordingly, buffer zones are not sensitive places.

... **Laws that broadly negate the right to arms are not legitimate precedents.** Laws that widely prohibit bearing arms are contrary to the text of the Second Amendment. Accordingly, they are not a legitimate part of the history and tradition of the right to bear arms.

In my opinion the critical passages for 21-22 in this summary by KG are those bolded. It is clear that Bill 21-22 would widely prohibit carrying arms in a large variety of places within the County. As KG observe, “Laws that widely prohibit bearing arms are contrary to the text of the Second Amendment.” Moreover, as they suggest, an argument that such places are crowded will be insufficient to sustain the constitutionality of Bill 21-22 under heightened scrutiny.

Bill 21-22 defines places of public assembly to those listed in Bill 4-21. Most of those places though do not meet the criteria KG outline in their summary for sensitive places. The places I think that do not meet those criteria are places of worship, recreational facilities, hospital, community health centers, long-term facility, multipurpose exhibition facilities (e.g., fairgrounds or conference centers). Such places are not places where most persons are minors, they are not places which concentrate adversarial conduct and they are not places where passionate angry emotions are generated. Declaring them off limits to the legal carriage of guns therein again will prove to be on constitutionally infirm ground based the guidance in Bruen.

Another issue of Bill 21-22 is the creation 100-yard buffers zones around places of public assembly. Such buffer zones under Bruen are most likely not be justifiable for Second Amendment cases. KG reviewed several court cases regarding buffer zones around sensitive places of which I will summarize one. The case is an Illinois case termed, the People v. Chairez. The State of Illinois had made it illegal to carry a firearm within a 1,000-foot buffer zone around a state park. According to KG (269), the Illinois Supreme Court ruled: “that the law severely burdened the core of the right to bear arms, because it prohibited the carriage of weapons for self-defense and it affected the entire law-abiding population of Illinois.” Moreover the Court found that the ‘State was unable to support its “assertion that a 1000–foot firearm ban around a public park protects children, as well as other vulnerable persons, from firearm violence” ’ (KG, 269f.). Bill 21-22 appears to contain both defects found in People v. Chairez: it affects the entire law-abiding population of Montgomery County; and the County will be unable to support an assertion that buffer zones protect children and vulnerable persons. Consequently, the buffer zones themselves are not sensitive places and would be ruled unconstitutional. Moreover, based on the guidance in the Bruen decision, even if the County could show that such buffer zones might protect children and vulnerable persons that would be insufficient to meet the criterion of being within “the historical tradition of firearm regulation” and so would be declared unconstitutional based solely on that.

We turn next to Amicus Curiae brief filed by Independent Institute (BII) in the Bruen Case for further guidance on the issue of sensitive places and longstanding traditions of restricting Second Amendment rights. In BII, there is a short review of American laws regarding sensitive places, which it sometimes terms, “gun-free zones.” According to BII (11), in colonial America, “gun-free zones through the time of the Founding were limited ...”
A notable exception was Maryland’s ban on bringing weapons into houses of Assembly (government buildings). According to BII (12) Virginia followed up on that a century later when it ‘forbade most (but not all) people from “com[ing] before the Justices of any Court, or other of their Ministers of Justice, doing their office, with force and arms.” … Virginia’s law also barred citizens from carrying arms “in other places,” but only when such carrying was done “in terror of the country,” id., thus respecting a general right to peaceably carry but carving out a narrow exception for courts.’ Thus, according to BII, government buildings would meet the criterion laid down in Bruen of being consistent with “this Nation’s historic tradition of firearm regulation” insofar as such bans are longstanding traditions. On the other hand, a ban on firearms in a wide variety of places of public assembly, such as in 21-22, would not be consistent with that historic tradition because there is no longstanding tradition of banning firearms in such places. Hence, the constitutionality of such a bill would no doubt not be upheld in federal court based on the guidance the Court provided in Bruen.

BII does indicate certain narrow conditions under which government can ban firearms consistent with the Second Amendment (see BII, 22). It writes:

The most obvious way is to limit modern gun-free zones to areas in which the government has demonstrated a serious commitment and a realistic ability to ensure public safety. This can be accomplished by ensuring that would-be criminals are prevented by more than the normative power of a legal prohibition to remain unarmed through, e.g., the provision of law enforcement officers and armed security, along with metal detectors or other defensive instruments.

It writes further (BII 24):

If the government cannot (or chooses not to) provide protection similar to that at airports in other areas, then designating those areas as “gun free” necessarily eviscerates (sic.) the self-defense right and, accordingly, constitutes a Second Amendment violation.

It would appear from BII, that if the Council bans firearms in public places without its supplying adequate security and specifically by supplying adequate law enforcement personnel and metal detectors, it will have eviscerated the self-rights of the citizens of Montgomery County and anyone else who comes into the County. Hence, I think that under the current guidance found in Bruen, Expedited Bill 21-22 is on infirm constitutional grounds and will be found unconstitutional in federal court.