Natural Gas Explosion
Montgomery Village Center
19211 Watkins Mill Road
June 16, 1993
Box 8-4

7 Firefighters and
2 WGL Employees Injured

The pages that follow along with accompanying video and photos are the core of an after action report following a natural gas explosion at Montgomery Village Center on June 15/16, 1993.

The documentation herein is not all inclusive. Investigative documents that support finding and recommendations were equivalent to two three-inch binders. We did find that some unit reports were missing. Some of what you find is a sample. For example, you may only see one page each of the SCBA inspection, gear inspection, and station safety inspection.

Many firefighters were injured. The details of their injuries are not disclosed – nor will you find EMS reports in this document. The entire paper report has been archived with the Operations Division.

Through technology, we were able to capture still photos, convert a VHS tape to digital format, and scan original documents to pdf for easy distribution. As you browse through this information, you should easily be able to recognize current practices in our system that came from the recommendations.

Special thanks to Firefighter Elizabeth Marshall who discovered the box left by Roger Strock in a closet at Station 8. She organized and cataloged the information. I also want to thank Master Firefighter Dave Galt (Digital Guru) who converted the video and still photographs to digital format.

Read and Learn

Battalion Chief Barry C. Reid
May 18, 2007

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Call Type BOX.....   D  H  P  T    DISPLAY CALL                Incident No 93034046
         BOX ALARM
Loc 18211 WATKINS MILL RD @GIANT FOOD..................... APT. ..... City MCG.
    STEDWICK RD
Name  ROMEOLD.....................
Add   18211 WATKINS MILL RD ;GIANT SUPERMARKET  Phone# 948-6185  Area Code 301
Rmks  GAS ODOR IN THE GIANT //GAS CO NOTF 2328 *TZ6 ENRT TO FC1 * 2 ADL M...
      SGAH/HAND, LEFT SHOULD INJ -0103 EMS1 SUB PR2 -0106 *BLDG, HEALTH &... +05
Prty 4 Lev FH Src P Rd 0804U. Sta 06.. Ca 01 P# ........ F# 93034064 E# ........

911 231024 Rc 231136 Ds 231150 En 231331 Ar 231617 Wf 011416 Fo 011416 01 ......
Date 061593 Tak-Id WILE.. Disp-Id FRIE.. Alarm Lv 2. Radio Chs ........ ........
Dispo Code 2.  Rmks OUT OF UNIT.....................................................
Unit Ids   E61     E261    T8      E291    E171    T29     RS9     A88     D08
           C29     DFRS    FM51    C82     CM8     C291    E172    E311    E31
           E231    E131    T31     T3      M89     AR1     D17     D8      EMS
           MULT    A289    A299    A319    C200    FM50    FM10    D03     FM3
           U3      FC1     K85     C205    T26     FM1     U33     U29     FM52
FDC 34046
FUH E61 061593
FUH M89
FIH 34046  014731
```

CLEAR SCREEN FORWARD PRINT SCREEN RETRIEVE MESSAGE


TO WATKINS MILL RD
19205
TO WATKINS MILL
16
10011
"YMCA"
FD Conn
19219
21
23
19227
G
SPRL RM.
10001
ROAD
Loading - Delivery
FD Conn
19233
2
3
5
Spkr Rm
LOAD DOCK
CORRIDOR
19142
LOAD DOCK
19214
9921
19122
19114
1910
AP office
Corridor
19204
19134
19138
19150
9200
206
208
210
Metal Shutters Doors-Windows
AP
FD Conn
Sprkl Rm
FD Conn
MALL
SERVICE
ROAD
STEDWICK
G
19100
FD Conn
stairs
E
19198
DRIVE-IN BANK
MONTGOMERY
VILLAGE
TO STA 8
HANSON '90

BOX 8-4 GIANT FOOD
19211 WATKINS MILL ROAD

JUNE 15, 1993

2311 E81, 281, & T8 were dispatched for an odor of gas in the Giant Food Store, upon arrival found heavy odor of gas in the store. When checking the exterior of the store found a fire at the gas meter on side 4 quadrant C, Sgt. Owens requested the Box assignment.

2335 Box 8-4 dispatched adding E291, 171, 172, T29, RS9, A88, D8 & Chief 29

2340 Command 8 established by Duty 8 on side 1.

2355 S9 checking EXP on side 4 - clear.

0001 E291 & 172 checking inside 19211 - heavy odor.

0010 T29 to roof, 19211 opening roof.

0015 T29/S9 placed PPU fans sides 1 & 3 of 19211.

0025 T29/S9 pulling ceiling tiles in 19211.

0037 Gas shut off.

0038 EXPLOSION!!

0040 2ND Alarm
E311, E31, E131, E231, T31, T3, A299, A319, Duty 3
A289, M89, Duty 17

0050 E311, 31 to side 3.

- removed injured to aid area at YMCA
- treated and transported
- moved all personnel back in the parking lot 200 feet
- moved apparatus back 200 feet

0140 E231 reported some roof areas falling and requested area be roped off, also assigned with T3 to check Peoples (19142) and Evans (19150) stores - clear at **0200**

0145 E131, 172 assigned to check 711 store, reported clear at **0200**

0153 T31 and crew to assist E231 & T3's crew at Peoples and Evans stores.

0215 E231, T3 & 31 reported 19138, 19200 MUA clear.

0220 Rehab 291, 171, 172, T8, T29.

0225 Rehab T3.

0235 Reviewed the release of units.

0300 Canteen 3 on scene.

0300 U30 talking to Rodbell, Ohler, Cooley, & Bindl at Station 8.

0305 Hold [81-281-T8] 171-311-31-T31&29-S9-M89, 289
Air 1
Clear 231-291-172-131, T3 - A299-319

0305 T31 return to side 1 of Giant to light up side 1 . . .

0310 Gas Company reported Peoples & Evans were still clear.

0321 E171 relieved E311 on side 3.

Department of Fire and Rescue Services
Bureau of Operations
District II

June 21, 1993

To: A/C William D. McLaughlin
District II

From: Capt. Roger W. Strock
Senior Career Officer

Subject: 19211 Watkins Mill Road

As you have requested, the following are the notes I prepared on the morning of June 16, 1993, following the explosion at 19211 Watkins Mill Road.

1. At 2311 on June 15, 1993, E81, E281 and T8 were dispatched for an odor of gas in the Giant Store at 19211 Watkins Mill Road. They searched the building for the source, and discovered a gas fed fire on the exterior of this building on side 4.

2. Apparently one of the officers requested the box, a fire marshall and utility companies.

3. Box 8-4 was dispatched at 2335.

4. I responded as Duty 8, and when I arrived established Command 8 on side 1 at approximately 2340.
   a. Giant was evacuated, and the other stores were closed.
   b. Requested and received an alternate channel. Channel 3 was originally given to this incident.
   c. D/C Dmuchowski arrived and was assigned Sector 3.
   d. Chief May arrived and started setting up a command post out of the rear of the Germantown duty vehicle. Instead of using Car 8-4 as the command post, I left it out in the parking lot and moved in to use the Germantown vehicle when I noticed the chief's actions.
   e. A88 set up an aid station near the command post.
   f. I was advised by one of the on scene officers that they had a gas fed fire on side 4, and that they were letting it burn while protecting a wooden decorative siding which was above the brick wall where the fire was burning.
   g. T29 was ordered to open the roof scuttles. They positioned at the corner of sides 1 and 2, laddered

the building, and opened a 3' x 3' scuttle and a 4' x 4' vent.
h. E291 was ordered to lay a line from the hydrant at the corner of sides 1 and 2, and advance a line into the Giant to check for extension. The unit did not lay out, but did proceed to the area in front of the corner of Sides 1 and 4. They happened to position so that the front of the vehicle was aimed away from the structure. They were using E134 with a front mount pump. I believe they extended a 1 1/2" line into the Giant. No extension found. After their investigation, crew came out. Later E171 layed a supply line for E291 to the hydrant at the corner of side 1 and 2.
i. FF A. Coleman, off A88, was directed to open the beer and wine store, exposure 4-1, and check for gas or extension, none was observed.
* The beer store was checked with a gas trac and then frequently checked by firefighters using the store to go from side 3 to the front of the complex.

5. Gas company was again requested, and I was given a 20 minute ETA.

6. Gas company arrived around 0001 hours.

7. Around 0015, T29 placed PPV fans in the front doors of the Giant that were closest to the corner of side 1 and 2. Later PPV fans were placed on the two exit doors of the Giant on side 3.

8. Gas company apparently had difficulty finding street cut off valves.

9. Rehab area was established on the parking lot side of Squad 9.

10. Around 0025, T29 and Squad 9 entered Giant in full protective gear to displace ceiling tiles in an effort to clear the area above the suspended ceiling.

11. Continually checked with Sector 3 to ascertain fire conditions. No changes were reported.

12. At 0037, gas company apparently started to shut off the correct valve. Sector 3 reported the fire was going out.

*Crews in the rear later stated that they heard some popping and rumbling sounds. They started running and the explosion occurred.

I

13. As soon as realized the severity, requested a second alarm to stage in the parking lot.
    a. Evacuation signal was sounded.
    b. Had difficulty getting a quick accounting of crews. Fortunately, the number of personnel in each crew was recorded on the incident control board.
    c. Channel 3 was unreadable from Sector 3, after repeated tries at establishing the extent of injuries in the rear, ECC moved our incident to Channel 1.
    d. When couldn't get a readable report from Sector 3, immediately sent T29's crew around to side 3 to evaluate and report on situation.
    e. Requested three BLS and one ALS unit. A88 relocated to the newly established EMS sector on side 4 in the YMCA parking lot and started rendering aid. Squad 9 was ordered to the EMS sector to light up the area and provide treatment.
    f. When report wasn't received as soon as I thought appropriate at the time, Chief May remained at the command post and I went to the rear to assess needs.
    g. Sgt. Crittenden was assigned as EMS sector officer, and coordinated the treatment and transport of the injured to Suburban and Shady Grove Hospitals.

14. Moved crews, and later apparatus, farther from the front of the Giant.

15. Stores in main mall, and strip of stores distant to side 2 (7-11, etc.) were checked and found to be clear.

16. Command bus arrived. A rehab was set up adjacent to the command bus, and FFIII Garland was assigned to manage this function.
    a. Porta-potties were ordered by the command bus staff.
    b. FM's office had requested ATF assistance some time during the incident.

17. Through the rest of the night, stores were periodically checked by fire department and gas company crews. No other gas problems were detected. All buildings were checked again just before owners and tenants were allowed to enter.


BC - BEN COLEMAN *
BM - BOB McHENRY
CM - CHARLIE MAIN
CP - CHUCK PEMBERTON
EC - EVERETT COATES *
IR - IVAN RODBELL
JB - JEFF BENNETT
JC - JAY COOLEY
MD - MIKE D'MOCHOWSKI
RM - RON McGREW
RO - RANDY OWENS
*WGL PERSONNEL
19205
E
A-88
E-172
CAR 8-4
GAS SHUT OFFS
JC
BM
T-8
E-291
COMMAND 8
T-29
E-171
FD Conn
WINDOWS
BLOWN
OUT
DEBRIS
1½"
SCHENKS HARDWARE
19219
HAIR SALON
21
GRAPE & GRATH
23
WALL BLOWN OUT
FIRE BALLS
GIANT
19211
4'X4' VENT OPENING
TOP OF WALL GONE
MOSTLY INTACT
G
RO
EC
JB
MD
MERCHANDISE
RM
PALLETS
BB
CM
IR
CP
E-281
SMALL SCUTTLE
SCUTTLE OPENING 3'X3'
SPRL RM.
PPV
Loading - Delivery
FD Conn
E-81 ON HYDRANT
Sprk Rm

TRUCK 8 - PARKED ON SIDE ONE IN FRONT OF STORES WHERE EXPLOSION BLEW GLASS AND DEBRIS APPROX.200 FEET INTO PARKING LOT. TWO PERSONNEL WERE BEHIND THE TRUCK WHEN THE EXPLOSION HAPPENDED.



SIDE ONE OF GRAPE & GRAIN STORE - 19223 WATKINS MILL ROAD

OVERVIEW OF SIDE ONE OF STORES AFFECTED BY EXPLOSION. NOTE AMOUNT OF DEBRIS THAT FORCEFULLY BLEW OUT FRONT OF STORES.



OVERHEAD VIEW FROM TOP OF GIANT FOOD SHOWING SIDE 3 - NOTE WALLS AT REAR OF HARDWARE STORE - 19219 WATKINS MILL ROAD - WALLS POSED SIGNIFICANT POST EXPLOSION COLLAPSE HAZARD.



OVERHEAD ROOF SHOT FROM GIANT SHOWING DAMAGE TO ROOF STRUCTURE OF THE THREE STORES INVOLVED. NOTE MEMBRANE ROOFING WHICH MOVED DUE TO STRESS OF EXPLOSION.

AREA TO RIGHT OF CENTER IS REAR OF GRAPE & GRAIN - 19223 WATKINS MILL ROAD - GAS LEAK & FIRE IN CORNER TO REAR OF THAT STORE - NOTE HANDLINE UNDER DEBRIS.

SIDE 1 - 19223
WATKINS MILL RD.
GRAPE & GRAIN STORE





SIDE #3 - 19219, 21 & 23 WATKINS MILL ROAD - GIANT FOOD STORE ON RIGHT - INJURED FIREFIGHTERS/GAS LEAK & FIRE FOUND IN CORNER NEXT TO GIANT - NOTE E281's HAND LINE UNDER DEBRIS.



SIDE 4 OF THREE STORES INVOLVED IN EXPLOSION.



OVERHEAD VIEW OF AREA WHERE SOME FIREFIGHTERS AND ONE WASHINGTON GAS EMPLOYEE WERE OPERATING AT TIME OF EXPLOSION. E281's HANDLINE WAS UNDER THE DEBRIS.



SIDE ONE SIDEWALK AREA IN FRONT OF STORES WHERE EXPLOSION OCCURRE

SIDE FOUR - HARDWARE STORE WALL -

MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD.
DEPARTMENT OF FIRE AND RESCUE SERVICES
BUREAU OF OPERATIONS

June 21, 1993

TO: Assistant Chief Dennis McLaughlin
IIT Team Leader

FROM: Assistant Chief Monte L. Fitch
District 5

SUBJECT: Protective Clothing / SCBA Survey

PROTECTIVE CLOTHING

Firefighter III Richard Hoye (1664) and I have surveyed the protective clothing and SCBA worn by Department firefighters injured and sent to the hospital from injuries sustained during the fire/gas explosion incident Tuesday June 15, 1993 0038 hours, 19211 Watkins Mill Road.

The completed survey forms are attached to this memorandum, documenting protective clothing worn by each firefighter and condition of gear when surveyed.

Firefighter's protective clothing plays a significant role in their protection during an emergency incident. After careful survey of the protective clothing being worn by firefighters during this incident, we have not found any damage to the gear being worn, that can be attributed to the explosion.

One disturbing fact, some firefighters on side three were NOT wearing the total protective envelope during the time hose lines were in operation in the area of the gas leak/fire.

The Personnel Injury Data sheet indicates some firefighter sustained injuries such as various cuts, bruises, abrasions, these may have been eliminated or less serious if full protection had been worn.

SCBA

Two SCBA units were surveyed, there was not any damage that can be attributed to the explosion.

One injury may have been attributed to the pack (harness) when he fell, possibly causing rib fractures. Personnel were located outside at the time of the explosion, had a fireball been lower or if firefighters had been inside the building, the use of SCBA (breathing air) would have offered the necessary respiratory protection.

RECOMMENDATION: ANYTIME PERSONNEL ARE WORKING WITHIN THE CONFINES OF A BUILDING WITH A GAS LEAK, OR IN ANY AREA OUTSIDE THAT HAS A HAZARDOUS LEVEL READING ON THE GAS DETECTOR, ALL PERSONNEL SHOULD BE IN FULL PROTECTIVE CLOTHING AND BREATHING AIR FROM THEIR SCBA.

attachments:

1. personnel injury data sheet
2. protective clothing survey
3. scba survey
4. 8 & 28 station inspection forms
5. Globe spec

PROTECTIVE CLOTHING SURVEYED FROM INCIDENT #93034046

*Sgt. R. Owens	28C	All protective clothing seen
**Sgt. W. Bendl	8C	" " " "
*MFR C. Main	28C	" " " "
*MFR R. McGrew	28C	" " " "
*F/F N. Pemberton	28C	" " " " except helmet & boots
*F/F J. Bennett	28C	" " " " except helmet, gloves, hood
F/F K Plunkett	9C	Gear sent to 25 for review, but he was not injured.

Unknown firefighter's helmet and gloves sent to 25 for review, we were unable to determine who this equipment was assigned to .

1 extra large blue DFRS T-shirt (cut in half by EMS personnel) also with gear to be reviewed.

* injured and sent to the hospital
** injured

SCBA SURVEY

19211 WATKINS MILL ROAD 6/15/93 INC.93034046

NAME_____STATION_____SHIFT_____

CONDITION OF:

FACE PIECE:

E-281 part #803923-02 Large W/out nose cup

normal appearance, neck strap attached.

REGULATOR: Serial # 8821373

normal in appearance attached to face piece functions when air turned on and alarm sounded when tested

PRESSURE REDUCER: Serial # 8821216

BOTTLE: 60 MIN____30 XX Serial # SC51956

BOTTLE PRESSURE slightly above 4000#

Hydro test 10/91
normal wear on bottle

Note: Serial # partly obscured by wear abrasions

HARNESS:

normal wear, cylinder band is loose about 1'' play

STRAPS: Kevlar and appearance is normal

PERSONAL ALERTING DEVICE:

ATTACHED TO SCBA? YES XX left strap GWVFD 23995

FUNCTIONAL? YES XX

Guard on PAL is broken off

M.L. Fitch
Assistant Chief M. L. Fitch

6/16/93
date

Richard E. Hoye
Firefighter Richard Hoye

6-16-93
date

GEAR SURVEY
19211 WATKINS MILL ROAD 6/15/93 INC.93034046

NAME Sgt. Randy Owens STATION 28 SHIFT C

LAST DATE OF INSPECTION 3/31/93

CONDITION OF: was it being used at the time of the explosion?

BUNKER COAT: YES ✓ NO____
Globe Fairfax Co. spec. 1088, 40-35 #200205 Oct. 88 Storm flap is legible, label on inside coat pocket is worn and cannot be read easily. Corduroy collar not worn, coat is generally in good condition.
Inventory: LEFT - pair gloves, gas tags, pair trama scissors, book matches.
RIGHT - plier
Inside Pocket - Nomex hood (w/ name of Kim Jones)

BUNKER PANTS: YES ✓ NO____
No bunker pants at this time 6/16/93

BUNKER BOOTS: YES ✓ NO____
*** no boots with Owens name in them, but the following boot was with gear.
Servus breaker NFPA 1974-1987ed boot 6 1/2 with gear. Boots in good condition, soles good.

GLOVES: YES ✓ NO____
Firecraft gloves 80026 Med. Nov. 88 NFPA 1973-1988ed. Name is on inside and outside of wristlets, in good condition.

HELMET AND EYE PROTECTION SHIELD: YES ✓ NO____
Carains N660C Sept. 1987, good shape, all components in tact. Shield in good condition.

HOOD: YES ✓ NO____
Good condition. belongs to Kim Jones

M L Fitch
Assistant Chief M. L. Fitch
6/16/93
date

Richard E. Hoye
Firefighter III Richard Hoye
6-16-93
date

STATION 8
4/93

DEPARTMENT OF FIRE AND RESCUE SERVICES
MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD.

STATION SAFETY INSPECTION FORM

Refer to Policy and Procedure # 813 for applicability and routing.

Directions: Inspect each area of the Fire/Rescue Station checking each of the listed items. Enter the appropriate notation in the right column based upon the following key: **O.K.** for acceptable, **N.A.** for not applicable, **V** for violation, **RV** for repeat violation. When V or RV is indicated, identify in the remarks section for each area, the specific violation and location.

A. Building Facility **Status**

1. Smoke alarms checked and operable	OK
2. Emergency power checked and operable (under load/emergency lighting)	OK
3. Hazardous/Flammable material (a) Insure all materials are properly stored	OK
(b) No smoking signs posted around flammable/combustible liquids	OK
(c) Emergency shut offs to fuel pumps operable and identified	OK
4. Exits - doors operable, properly marked, clear egress, stairs clear	OK
5. Fire alarm (for evacuation) tested and operable	OK
6. Fire extinguishers - mounted, inspection dates, maintenance	R.V.
7. Fire sprinkler system - secured in open position; proper pressure settings; heads free from obstructions	OK
8. Address numbers - 6"	OK
9. MOSH Act and posters in work place	R.V.

Montgomery County - Fire/Rescue Services

COMPLETED BY FIRST DUE UNIT ONLY

A — LOCATION INFORMATION

INCIDENT NO.	TIME	DATE	STATION RUN NO.	
5X0 340446	OUT: 0040 IN: 0957	6/15/93	F-520	CHANGE ☐ DELETE ☐

B — LOCATION INFORMATION

INCIDENT TYPE	ACTION TAKEN	OCCUPANT
59		

C — LOCATION INFORMATION

ADDRESS - LOCATION	CITY
19211 Watkins Mill Road	Gaith

D — LOCATION INFORMATION

FIRST DUE UNIT	DISTRICT	PROPERTY CLASSIFICATION	COMPLEX	INDIVIDUAL
E8,1	08			

COMPLETE IF FIRE – INCIDENT COMMANDER

E — FIRE INFORMATION

LEVEL OF ORIGIN	AREA OF ORIGIN	EQUIPMENT INVOLVED AS SOURCE OF IGNITION	FORM OF HEAT OF IGNITION
5X2			

F — FIRE INFORMATION

TYPE OF MATERIAL IGNITED	FORM OF MATERIAL IGNITED	ACT OR OMISSION ORIGIN OF FIRE	MAIN AVENUES OF FIRE SPREAD

G — FIRE INFORMATION

TYPE OF MATERIAL MOST RESPONSIBLE FOR FIRE SPREAD	FORM OF MATERIAL MOST RESPONSIBLE FOR FIRE SPREAD	ACT OR OMISSION MOST RESPONSIBLE FOR FIRE SPREAD

H — FIRE INFORMATION

ESTIMATED LOSS			CASUALTY	F.P.O.	POLICE
STRUCTURE	CONTENTS	OTHER			

I — FIRE INFORMATION

PROBABLE CAUSE

J — FIRE INFORMATION

MOBILE PROPERTY	MAKE	MODEL	SERIAL NO.	LICENSE NO.
YEAR				

COMPLETE FOR EACH UNIT RESPONDING

K — UNIT INFO

INCIDENT NO.	SUPP.	UNIT	ASSIGNED STATION	RESPONDED FROM	DISPOSITION	TRANSFER STATION NO.
60 340446		T3,1	31	31	☐ 11 = IN SERV. W/RESP. ☐ 22 = NO SERV. ☐ 33 = SERV. REND. ☐ 44 = SERV. REFUSED	33

L — UNIT INFO

UNIT OPERATION	PERSONNEL ON UNIT									
☐ 1 = NONE ☐ 2 = SEARCH/RESCUE ☐ 3 = EXTINGUISHMENT ☐ 4 = FIRST-AID/RESCUE ☐ 5 = INVESTIGATION ☐ 6 = VENTILATION/SALVAGE ☐ 7 = OTHER		PD.	VOL.	AT SC.	PD.	VOL.	AT ST.	PD.	VOL.
7	ON UNIT	3	3		00	02		00	00

COMPLETE IF EQUIPMENT USED – FILL IN QUANTITY

M — EQUIPMENT INFO

HAND LINES					MASTER STREAMS	MASKS	FLOOD LIGHTS
BOOSTER	1 ½"	2"	2 ½"	3"			02

N — EQUIPMENT INFO

SUPPLY LINES				PUMPER PUMPED	LADDERS			GENERATORS	SMOKE EJECTORS
2 ½"	3"	4"	OVER 4"		UNDER 30'	OVER 30'	AERIAL		
					1			1	0

O — EQUIPMENT INFO

SALVAGE COVERS	PORTABLE PUMPS	POWER TOOLS	HAND TOOLS	FIRST/AID KITS
			04	0

P — EQUIPMENT INFO

HEAVY RESCUE EQUIPMENT	LIGHT RESCUE EQUIPMENT	OTHER (SPECIFY)
0	0	00

WILL OTHER STATIONS REPORT? ☑

Z — SIGNATURE

UNIT COMMANDER	INCIDENT COMMANDER
Kelly	Command 8

FS-100 (REV. 3/91)

STATION COPY

T31 340461

REMARKS:

Disp. 1ST TRUCK ON 2ND ALARM. AOS @ Staging & reported to command post as per instructions. Command 8 (Capt. Strack) directed T-31's crew to immediately s/o power-in Giant store that was full of Gas & being machetered for LEL & UEL. 3 members of T-31 entered building & s/o many low amperage breakers in several locations. @ that time Cmd. 8 instructed T31 to immediately exit building. We did so & reported back to command & were consequently recycled to Staging. Our next assignment was to assist E231 @ pagles off MVA w/ forceable entry & recon. Maintained that assignment for ± 2 hrs. Then sent to side 1 @ Giant to light area w/ on board floods. T31 then assisted WASH. Gas w/ Recon in Giant & clear bldg. Ceiling tiles were removed along ~~side~~ rep. #4 in Giant for access for bldg. inspectors.

Key

PERSONNEL

	PAID NAME	DRIVER	ON CALL	TO STA.	VOLUNTEER NAME	DRIVER	ON CALL	TO STA.
1.	Lawhorne		X		Kay		X	
2.	K. Tenaver	X	X		Ricci		X	
3.	Williamson		X		Christian		X	
4.					Chornock		X	
5.					Phillips		X	
6.								
7.								
8.								
9.								
10.								

FS-100

FIRE INCIDENT REPORT

Montgomery County - Fire/Rescue Services

COMPLETED BY FIRST DUE UNIT ONLY

A

INCIDENT NO.	TIME	DATE	STATION RUN NO.	
5X0 34 0446	OUT: 2335 IN: 0316	6/5/93	F373	CHANGE ☐ DELETE ☐

B

INCIDENT TYPE	ACTION TAKEN	OCCUPANT

C

ADDRESS - LOCATION	CITY
1921 Watkins Mill Rd	Gaithersburg

D

FIRST DUE UNIT	DISTRICT	PROPERTY CLASSIFICATION	COMPLEX	INDIVIDUAL

LOCATION INFORMATION

COMPLETE IF FIRE – INCIDENT COMMANDER

E

LEVEL OF ORIGIN	AREA OF ORIGIN	EQUIPMENT INVOLVED AS SOURCE OF IGNITION	FORM OF HEAT OF IGNITION
5X2	00		

F

TYPE OF MATERIAL IGNITED	FORM OF MATERIAL IGNITED	ACT OR OMISSION ORIGIN OF FIRE	MAIN AVENUES OF FIRE SPREAD

G

TYPE OF MATERIAL MOST RESPONSIBLE FOR FIRE SPREAD	FORM OF MATERIAL MOST RESPONSIBLE FOR FIRE SPREAD	ACT OR OMISSION MOST RESPONSIBLE FOR FIRE SPREAD

H

ESTIMATED LOSS STRUCTURE	CONTENTS	OTHER	CASUALTY	F.P.O.	POLICE

I

PROBABLE CAUSE

J

MOBILE PROPERTY YEAR	MAKE	MODEL	SERIAL NO.	LICENSE NO.

FIRE INFORMATION

COMPLETE FOR EACH UNIT RESPONDING

K

	INCIDENT NO.	SUPP.	UNIT	ASSIGNED STATION	RESPONDED FROM	DISPOSITION	
60	34 0446		E291	29	29	☐ 11 = IN SERV. W/RESP. ☒ 33 = SERV. REND. ☐ 22 = NO SERV. ☐ 44 = SERV. REFUSED	☐ TRANSFER STATION NO. 33

L

UNIT OPERATION	PERSONNEL ON UNIT	PD.	VOL.	AT SC. PD.	AT SC. VOL.	AT ST. PD.	AT ST. VOL.
☐ 1 = NONE ☐ 2 = SEARCH/RESCUE ☐ 3 = EXTINGUISHMENT ☐ 4 = FIRST-AID/RESCUE ☒ 5 = INVESTIGATION ☐ 6 = VENTILATION/SALVAGE ☐ 7 = OTHER 5	ON UNIT	1	4				

UNIT INFO

COMPLETE IF EQUIPMENT USED – FILL IN QUANTITY

M

61	HAND LINES BOOSTER	1 ½"	2"	2 ½"	3"	MASTER STREAMS	MASKS	FLOOD LIGHTS
	0	1	0	0	0	0	00	02

N

SUPPLY LINES 2 ½"	3"	4"	OVER 4"	PUMPER PUMPED	LADDERS UNDER 30'	OVER 30'	AERIAL	GENERATORS	SMOKE EJECTORS
0	0	0	0	N	0	0	0	0	0

O

SALVAGE COVERS	PORTABLE PUMPS	POWER TOOLS	HAND TOOLS	FIRST/AID KITS
00	0	0	00	0

P

HEAVY RESCUE EQUIPMENT	LIGHT RESCUE EQUIPMENT	OTHER (SPECIFY)
0	0	00

EQUIPMENT INFO

WILL OTHER STATIONS REPORT? ☐

Z

UNIT COMMANDER	INCIDENT COMMANDER
Sgt. CP Coleman	

SIGNATURE

FS-100 (REV. 3/91)

STATION COPY

E291

INCIDENT NO. | SUPP.

REMARKS:

ENG to 291 Responded on box 8-4 Gas leak with a working fire. to a broken Gas line. EN 281 pulled a 1 1/2" to through the store (front) we then searched the store for extension + people found nothing opened up back Exit door to see if there was anything out back see ENG 281 crew. went back inside made another search of the store went back outside Back door were p/c Druchowski had us go into a small storage room and climb up a ladder and open up the scuttle. and a vent on the roof when we come down command & had us report to ENG 281 standing by ENG 281 heard a noise and turned and then saw a explosion. Com Checked in with command to let them know. ENG 281 crew was all safe & accounted for. we were then placed in Rehab until we were released from the incident.

(ENG 281 crew inside was Sgt. Coleman and FF. Delgado.)

Sgt. Coleman

PERSONNEL

PAID				VOLUNTEER			
NAME	DRIVER	ON CALL	TO STA.	NAME	DRIVER	ON CALL	TO STA.
1.				Hurtzell	X	X	
2.				Coleman		X	
3.				Delgado		X	
4.				Ramsey		X	
5.				Atwell To Scene.			
6.							
7.							
8.							
9.							
10.							

FS-100

FIRE INCIDENT REPORT

Montgomery County - Fire/Rescue Services

COMPLETED BY FIRST DUE UNIT ONLY

A

INCIDENT NO.	TIME	DATE	STATION RUN NO.	
50 340416	OUT: 2335 IN: 0519	6/15/93	F373	CHANGE ☐ DELETE ☐

B

INCIDENT TYPE	ACTION TAKEN	OCCUPANT

C

ADDRESS - LOCATION	CITY
1921 WATKINS MILL ROAD	Germ

D

FIRST DUE UNIT	DISTRICT	PROPERTY CLASSIFICATION	COMPLEX	INDIVIDUAL
E81	08		58	

LOCATION INFORMATION

COMPLETE IF FIRE – INCIDENT COMMANDER

E

LEVEL OF ORIGIN	AREA OF ORIGIN	EQUIPMENT INVOLVED AS SOURCE OF IGNITION	FORM OF HEAT OF IGNITION
52			

F

TYPE OF MATERIAL IGNITED	FORM OF MATERIAL IGNITED	ACT OR OMISSION ORIGIN OF FIRE	MAIN AVENUES OF FIRE SPREAD

G

TYPE OF MATERIAL MOST RESPONSIBLE FOR FIRE SPREAD	FORM OF MATERIAL MOST RESPONSIBLE FOR FIRE SPREAD	ACT OR OMISSION MOST RESPONSIBLE FOR FIRE SPREAD

H

ESTIMATED LOSS STRUCTURE	CONTENTS	OTHER	CASUALTY	F.P.O.	POLICE

FIRE INFORMATION

PROBABLE CAUSE

J

MOBILE PROPERTY YEAR	MAKE	MODEL	SERIAL NO.	LICENSE NO.

COMPLETE FOR EACH UNIT RESPONDING

K

	INCIDENT NO.	SUPP.	UNIT	ASSIGNED STATION	RESPONDED FROM	DISPOSITION	TRANSFER STATION NO.
60	340416		T29	29	29	☐ 11 = IN SERV. W/RESP. ☐ 22 = NO SERV. ☒ 33 = SERV. REND. ☐ 44 = SERV. REFUSED	33

L

UNIT OPERATION	PERSONNEL ON UNIT	PD.	VOL.	AT SC. PD.	AT SC. VOL.	AT ST. PD.	AT ST. VOL.
☐ 1 = NONE ☐ 2 = SEARCH/RESCUE ☒ 3 = EXTINGUISHMENT ☐ 4 = FIRST-AID/RESCUE ☐ 5 = INVESTIGATION ☐ 6 = VENTILATION/SALVAGE ☒ 7 = OTHER 7	ON UNIT	2	1	00	00	00	00

UNIT INFO

COMPLETE IF EQUIPMENT USED – FILL IN QUANTITY

M

	HAND LINES BOOSTER	1 ½"	2"	2 ½"	3"	MASTER STREAMS	MASKS	FLOOD LIGHTS
61							03	06

N

SUPPLY LINES 2 ½"	3"	4"	OVER 4"	PUMPER PUMPED	LADDERS UNDER 30'	OVER 30'	AERIAL	GENERATORS	SMOKE EJECTORS
							1	1	PPV 2

O

SALVAGE COVERS	PORTABLE PUMPS	POWER TOOLS	HAND TOOLS	FIRST/AID KITS
			03	

P

HEAVY RESCUE EQUIPMENT	LIGHT RESCUE EQUIPMENT	OTHER (SPECIFY)

EQUIPMENT INFO

WILL OTHER STATIONS REPORT? ☐

Z

UNIT COMMANDER	INCIDENT COMMANDER
Lt M Boccabella	Duty 8

SIGNATURE

T29 0 0

INCIDENT NO.	SUPP.

REMARKS:

PROCEDED TO SIDE ONE LADDERED BLDG
REMOVED Lg VENT OPENINGS & REMOVED
SOME CEILING TILES AT GIANT FOOD.
ASSISTED WITH INJURED FIREFIGHTERS AND
PERFORMED OTHER DUTIES AS ASSIGNED
BY SUPERIORS. RETURNED TO STATION &
RETURNED TRUCK TO SERVICE

PERSONNEL

PAID				VOLUNTEER			
	NAME	DRIVER	ON CALL	TO STA.	NAME	DRIVER	ON CALL	TO STA.
1.	D. FINLAYSON	X			L. BATTLE			
2.	M. BOCCABELLO		X					
3.	G. LANCASTER		X					
4.								
5.								
6.								
7.								
8.								
9.								
10.								

FS-100

FIRE INCIDENT REPORT
Montgomery County - Fire/Rescue Services

COMPLETED BY FIRST DUE UNIT ONLY

A — INCIDENT NO.: 50 34046 | TIME: OUT: 0040 IN: 0307 | DATE: 6-16-93 | STATION RUN NO.: E-561 | CHANGE ☐ DELETE ☐

B — INCIDENT TYPE | ACTION TAKEN | OCCUPANT

C — ADDRESS - LOCATION: 19211 Watkins Mill Rd | CITY

D — FIRST DUE UNIT | DISTRICT | PROPERTY CLASSIFICATION | COMPLEX | INDIVIDUAL

COMPLETE IF FIRE — INCIDENT COMMANDER

E — 52 | LEVEL OF ORIGIN | AREA OF ORIGIN | EQUIPMENT INVOLVED AS SOURCE OF IGNITION | FORM OF HEAT OF IGNITION

F — TYPE OF MATERIAL IGNITED | FORM OF MATERIAL IGNITED | ACT OR OMISSION ORIGIN OF FIRE | MAIN AVENUES OF FIRE SPREAD

G — TYPE OF MATERIAL MOST RESPONSIBLE FOR FIRE SPREAD | FORM OF MATERIAL MOST RESPONSIBLE FOR FIRE SPREAD | ACT OR OMISSION MOST RESPONSIBLE FOR FIRE SPREAD

H — ESTIMATED LOSS: STRUCTURE | CONTENTS | OTHER | CASUALTY | F.P.O. | POLICE

I — PROBABLE CAUSE

J — MOBILE PROPERTY YEAR | MAKE | MODEL | SERIAL NO. | LICENSE NO.

COMPLETE FOR EACH UNIT RESPONDING

K — 60 | INCIDENT NO.: 34046 | SUPP.: - | UNIT: E231 | ASSIGNED STATION: 23 | RESPONDED FROM: 23 | DISPOSITION: ☐ 11 = IN SERV. W/RESP. ☐ 22 = NO SERV. ☒ 33 = SERV. REND. ☐ 44 = SERV. REFUSED | ☐ TRANSFER STATION NO. 3

L — UNIT OPERATION: ☐ 1 = NONE ☐ 2 = SEARCH/RESCUE ☐ 3 = EXTINGUISHMENT ☐ 4 = FIRST-AID/RESCUE ☐ 5 = INVESTIGATION ☐ 6 = VENTILATION/SALVAGE ☒ 7 = OTHER: 7 | PERSONNEL ON UNIT: ON UNIT FD. 3 VOL. 0 | AT SC. FD. 00 VOL. 00 | AT ST. FD. 00 VOL. 00

COMPLETE IF EQUIPMENT USED — FILL IN QUANTITY

M — 61 | HAND LINES: BOOSTER ☐ 1 1/2" ☐ 2" ☐ 2 1/2" ☐ 3" ☐ | MASTER STREAMS ☐ | MASKS ☐☐ | FLOOD LIGHTS ☐☐

N — SUPPLY LINES: 2 1/2" ☐ 3" ☐ 4" ☐ OVER 4" ☐ | PUMPER PUMPED ☐ | LADDERS: UNDER 30' ☐ OVER 30' ☐ AERIAL ☐ | GENERATORS ☐ | SMOKE EJECTORS ☐

O — SALVAGE COVERS ☐☐ | PORTABLE PUMPS ☐ | POWER TOOLS ☐ | HAND TOOLS ☐☐ | FIRST/AID KITS ☐

P — HEAVY RESCUE EQUIPMENT ☐ | LIGHT RESCUE EQUIPMENT ☐ | OTHER (SPECIFY) ☐☐

WILL OTHER STATIONS REPORT? ☐

Z — UNIT COMMANDER: Lt. Fleming | INCIDENT COMMANDER: Command 8

FS-100 (REV. 3/91)

REMARKS:

2nd alarm gas leak with explosion
Staged upon arrival.
Assigned to check various stores for gas,
Released by Command

PERSONNEL

	NAME	DRIVER	ON CALL	TO STA.
1.	Fleming	X	X	
2.	M. Jones	X		
3.	Coleman		X	
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				

FS-100

FIRE INCIDENT REPORT

Montgomery County - Fire/Rescue Services

COMPLETED BY FIRST DUE UNIT ONLY

A

INCIDENT NO.	TIME	DATE	STATION RUN NO.	
60 340446	OUT: 0042 IN: 0312	6/16/93	F402	CHANGE ☐ DELETE ☐

B

INCIDENT TYPE	ACTION TAKEN	OCCUPANT
11		

C

ADDRESS - LOCATION	CITY
19211 Watkins Mill Rd	Gaith

D

FIRST DUE UNIT	DISTRICT	PROPERTY CLASSIFICATION	COMPLEX	INDIVIDUAL
E81	08			

LOCATION INFORMATION

COMPLETE IF FIRE – INCIDENT COMMANDER

E

LEVEL OF ORIGIN	AREA OF ORIGIN	EQUIPMENT INVOLVED AS SOURCE OF IGNITION	FORM OF HEAT OF IGNITION
52			

F

TYPE OF MATERIAL IGNITED	FORM OF MATERIAL IGNITED	ACT OR OMISSION ORIGIN OF FIRE	MAIN AVENUES OF FIRE SPREAD

G

TYPE OF MATERIAL MOST RESPONSIBLE FOR FIRE SPREAD	FORM OF MATERIAL MOST RESPONSIBLE FOR FIRE SPREAD	ACT OR OMISSION MOST RESPONSIBLE FOR FIRE SPREAD

H

ESTIMATED LOSS STRUCTURE	CONTENTS	OTHER	CASUALTY	F.P.O.	POLICE

I

PROBABLE CAUSE

J

MOBILE PROPERTY YEAR	MAKE	MODEL	SERIAL NO.	LICENSE NO.

FIRE INFORMATION

COMPLETE FOR EACH UNIT RESPONDING

K

INCIDENT NO.	SUPP.	UNIT	ASSIGNED STATION	RESPONDED FROM	DISPOSITION	TRANSFER STATION NO.
60 340446		T3	03	03	☐ 11 = IN SERV. W/RESP. ☐ 22 = NO SERV. ☒ 33 = SERV. REND. ☐ 44 = SERV. REFUSED	33

L

UNIT OPERATION	PERSONNEL ON UNIT	PD.	VOL.	AT SC.	PD.	VOL.	AT ST.	PD.	VOL.
☐ 1 = NONE ☐ 2 = SEARCH/RESCUE ☐ 3 = EXTINGUISHMENT ☐ 4 = FIRST-AID/RESCUE ☐ 5 = INVESTIGATION ☐ 6 = VENTILATION/SALVAGE ☒ 7 = OTHER 7	ON UNIT	1	4		00	00		00	00

UNIT INFO

COMPLETE IF EQUIPMENT USED – FILL IN QUANTITY

M

	HAND LINES BOOSTER	1 1/2"	2"	2 1/2"	3"	MASTER STREAMS	MASKS	FLOOD LIGHTS
61	0	0	0	0	0	0	04	04

N

SUPPLY LINES 2 1/2"	3"	4"	OVER 4"	PUMPER PUMPED	LADDERS UNDER 30'	OVER 30'	AERIAL	GENERATORS	SMOKE EJECTORS
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0

O

SALVAGE COVERS	PORTABLE PUMPS	POWER TOOLS	HAND TOOLS	FIRST/AID KITS
00	6	0	07	0

P

HEAVY RESCUE EQUIPMENT	LIGHT RESCUE EQUIPMENT	OTHER (SPECIFY)
6	0	00

EQUIPMENT INFO

WILL OTHER STATIONS REPORT? ☐

Z

UNIT COMMANDER	INCIDENT COMMANDER
SGT Lanham	Command S

SIGNATURE

FS-100 (REV. 3/91)

STATION COPY

T3

INCIDENT NO.	SUPP.
3H10,710	

REMARKS:
AOS Went to staging In front of Saint, Per Command & took crew to side 3 with Gas company crew, To Check the Building to the Rear (19150 + 19142) forced entry In to 19150 + 19142 to check For Gas under Nothing found. In Building 19150 found two people In store they were asked to leave building and to stay out until told to Return. Check Rest of Store In that Section For occupants, no one found. Force entry In to sprinkler Room Next to 19200 + 19138 per command. After that Returned to Rehab and checked In then cleared per command 8-7

PERSONNEL

PAID				VOLUNTEER			
NAME	DRIVER	ON CALL	TO STA.	NAME	DRIVER	ON CALL	TO STA.
1. Hightower	/			Lanham		/	
2.				King		/	
3.				McLaughlin		/	
4.				Duguilla		/	
5.							
6.							
7.							
8.							
9.							
10.							

FS-100

Montgomery County - Fire/Rescue Services

Jay Dooley

COMPLETED BY FIRST DUE UNIT ONLY

A: INCIDENT NO. 5 0 3 4 0 4 6 | TIME OUT: 0247 IN: 0500 | DATE 6/16/93 | STATION RUN NO. | CHANGE ☐ DELETE ☐

B: INCIDENT TYPE | ACTION TAKEN | OCCUPANT

C: ADDRESS - LOCATION 19211 Watkins Mill Rd. | CITY

D: FIRST DUE UNIT E 9 1 | DISTRICT 0 8 | PROPERTY CLASSIFICATION | COMPLEX | INDIVIDUAL

COMPLETE IF FIRE – INCIDENT COMMANDER

E: LEVEL OF ORIGIN 5 2 | AREA OF ORIGIN | EQUIPMENT INVOLVED AS SOURCE OF IGNITION | FORM OF HEAT OF IGNITION

F: TYPE OF MATERIAL IGNITED | FORM OF MATERIAL IGNITED | ACT OR OMISSION ORIGIN OF FIRE | MAIN AVENUES OF FIRE SPREAD

G: TYPE OF MATERIAL MOST RESPONSIBLE FOR FIRE SPREAD | FORM OF MATERIAL MOST RESPONSIBLE FOR FIRE SPREAD | ACT OR OMISSION MOST RESPONSIBLE FOR FIRE SPREAD

H: ESTIMATED LOSS — STRUCTURE | CONTENTS | OTHER | CASUALTY | F.P.C. | POLICE

I: PROBABLE CAUSE

J: MOBILE PROPERTY YEAR | MAKE | MODEL | SERIAL NO. | LICENSE NO.

COMPLETE FOR EACH UNIT RESPONDING

K: 6 0 INCIDENT NO. 3 4 0 4 6 | SUPP. | UNIT D 3 | ASSIGNED STATION 0 3 | RESPONDED FROM 8 6 | DISPOSITION ☐ 11 = IN SERV. W/RESP. ☐ 33 = NO SERV. ☐ 55 = SERV. RENDERED ☐ 44 = SERV. REFUSED ☐ TRANSFER STATION NO. 3 3

L: UNIT OPERATION ☐ 1 = NONE ☐ 2 = SEARCH/RESCUE ☐ 3 = EXTINGUISHMENT ☐ 4 = FIRST-AID/RESCUE ☐ 5 = INVESTIGATION ☐ 6 = VENTILATION/SALVAGE ☑ 7 = OTHER | PERSONNEL ON UNIT — ON UNIT PD. 1 VOL. | AT SC. PD. VOL. | AT ST. PD. VOL.

COMPLETE IF EQUIPMENT USED – FILL IN QUANTITY

M: HAND LINES BOOSTER | 1 ½" | 2" | 2 ½" | 3" | MASTER STREAMS | MASKS | FLOOD LIGHTS

N: SUPPLY LINES 2 ½" | 3" | 4" | OVER 4" | PUMPER PUMPED | LADDERS UNDER 30' | OVER 30' | AERIAL | GENERATORS | SMOKE EJECTORS

O: SALVAGE COVERS | PORTABLE PUMPS | POWER TOOLS | HAND TOOLS | FIRST/AID KITS

P: HEAVY RESCUE EQUIPMENT | LIGHT RESCUE EQUIPMENT | OTHER (SPECIFY)

WILL OTHER STATIONS REPORT? ☐

Z: UNIT COMMANDER Capt. [illegible] | INCIDENT COMMANDER

FS-100 (REV. 3/91)

STATION COPY

D3

INCIDENT NO. 3-4046 SUPP.

REMARKS: Resp. to task assignment on 2nd alarm - apt. gas explosion in the bld.
Arrived O.T.S.; reported to command post for assignment. Assisted in extinguishing appliance [illegible] apt. zone on sides 1&2.
CR34 used temporarily as command post, until re-located into Field Comm. I. Assigned task of reporting to S.G.A. Hosp. to check on status of pvt. man, FF [illegible]; FF [illegible].
Assisted all to obtain personal belongings and rides home after being treated & released by the E.R. All O.K. except one with minor to moderate orthopedic injuries.
Then cleared.

Capt. M.T. Hamilton

PERSONNEL

PAID NAME	DRIVER	ON CALL	TO STA.	VOLUNTEER NAME	DRIVER	ON CALL	TO STA.
1. Capt. Hamilton	CR 34	✓					
2.							
3.							
4.							
5.							
6.							
7.							
8.							
9.							
10.							

FS-100

COMPLETED BY FIRST DUE UNIT ONLY

LOCATION INFORMATION

A — 5 0 | INCIDENT NO.: 34046 | TIME OUT: 0040 IN: 0438 | DATE: 6/16/93 | STATION RUN NO.: F520 | CHANGE ☐ DELETE ☐

B — INCIDENT TYPE: 59 | ACTION TAKEN: | OCCUPANT:

C — ADDRESS - LOCATION: 19211 Watkins Mill Rd | CITY: Gaithers.

D — FIRST DUE UNIT: E8 | DISTRICT: 08 | PROPERTY CLASSIFICATION: | COMPLEX: | INDIVIDUAL:

COMPLETE IF FIRE — INCIDENT COMMANDER

FIRE INFORMATION

E — 5 2 | LEVEL OF ORIGIN: | AREA OF ORIGIN: | EQUIPMENT INVOLVED AS SOURCE OF IGNITION: | FORM OF HEAT OF IGNITION:

F — TYPE OF MATERIAL IGNITED: | FORM OF MATERIAL IGNITED: | ACT OR OMISSION ORIGIN OF FIRE: | MAIN AVENUES OF FIRE SPREAD:

G — TYPE OF MATERIAL MOST RESPONSIBLE FOR FIRE SPREAD: | FORM OF MATERIAL MOST RESPONSIBLE FOR FIRE SPREAD: | ACT OR OMISSION MOST RESPONSIBLE FOR FIRE SPREAD:

H — ESTIMATED LOSS: STRUCTURE: CONTENTS: OTHER: | CASUALTY: | F.P.O.: | POLICE:

I — PROBABLE CAUSE:

J — MOBILE PROPERTY YEAR: | MAKE: | MODEL: | SERIAL NO.: | LICENSE NO.:

COMPLETE FOR EACH UNIT RESPONDING

UNIT INFO

K — 6 0 | INCIDENT NO.: 34046 | SUPP.: | UNIT: E311 | ASSIGNED STATION: 31 | RESPONDED FROM: 08 | DISPOSITION: ☐ 11 = IN SERV. W/RESP. ☐ 22 = NO SERV. ☒ 33 = SERV. REND. ☐ 44 = SERV. REFUSED | ☐ TRANSFER STATION NO. 35

L — UNIT OPERATION: ☐ 1 = NONE ☐ 2 = SEARCH/RESCUE ☒ 3 = EXTINGUISHMENT ☐ 4 = FIRST-AID/RESCUE ☐ 5 = INVESTIGATION ☐ 6 = VENTILATION/SALVAGE ☐ 7 = OTHER — 3

PERSONNEL ON UNIT: ON UNIT PD. 2 VOL. 3 | AT SC. PD. 00 VOL. 00 | AT ST. PD. 00 VOL. 00

COMPLETE IF EQUIPMENT USED — FILL IN QUANTITY

EQUIPMENT INFO

M — 6 1 | HAND LINES: BOOSTER, 1 ½", 2", 2 ½", 3" | MASTER STREAMS | MASKS | FLOOD LIGHTS

N — SUPPLY LINES: 2 ½", 3", 4", OVER 4" | PUMPER PUMPED | LADDERS: UNDER 30', OVER 30', AERIAL | GENERATORS | SMOKE EJECTORS

O — SALVAGE COVERS | PORTABLE PUMPS | POWER TOOLS | HAND TOOLS | FIRST/AID KITS

P — HEAVY RESCUE EQUIPMENT | LIGHT RESCUE EQUIPMENT | OTHER (SPECIFY): Water Cooler 01

WILL OTHER STATIONS REPORT? ☐

SIGNATURE

Z — UNIT COMMANDER: Sgt. D. Lupp | INCIDENT COMMANDER: Command 8

FS-100 (REV. 3/91)

STATION COPY

E311

D110416

REMARKS:

Resp 1ST Due on 2nd Alarm. Reported to Command as ordered. Assigned to Sector 3 w/ E31 to retrieve E281's line & establish protection line on S3. Unable to recover E281's line. Pulled 1 3/4" crosslay for protection. Established Hot No-Go Zone on S3. Re-Evaluated E281's position w/ C205 & decided to move E281 from area. Broke down E281 & moved to safe area. Assigned Sector 3 by C205. Attempted to ensure safety of various F/R & WGL personel in S3 - S4 area due to continuing collapse hazard. Unit stood by, until released by Command. Unit in Service.

PERSONNEL

PAID				VOLUNTEER			
NAME	DRIVER	ON CALL	TO STA.	NAME	DRIVER	ON CALL	TO STA
1. E. Price	X			Neary		X	
2. D. Lipp		X		Henry		X	
3.				Elliott		X	
4.				Wynes		X	
5.							
6.							
7.							
8.							
9.							
10.							

FS-100

FIRE INCIDENT REPORT

Montgomery County - Fire/Rescue Services

COMPLETED BY FIRST DUE UNIT ONLY

A

INCIDENT NO.	TIME	DATE	STATION RUN NO.	
50 3404 46	OUT: 0040 IN: 0441	6/16/93	F802	CHANGE ☐ DELETE ☐

B

INCIDENT TYPE	ACTION TAKEN	OCCUPANT
11		

C

ADDRESS - LOCATION	CITY
19211 WATKINS MILL RD	

D

FIRST DUE UNIT	DISTRICT	PROPERTY CLASSIFICATION	COMPLEX	INDIVIDUAL
E81	08			

COMPLETE IF FIRE – INCIDENT COMMANDER

E

52	LEVEL OF ORIGIN	AREA OF ORIGIN	EQUIPMENT INVOLVED AS SOURCE OF IGNITION	FORM OF HEAT OF IGNITION

F

TYPE OF MATERIAL IGNITED	FORM OF MATERIAL IGNITED	ACT OR OMISSION ORIGIN OF FIRE	MAIN AVENUES OF FIRE SPREAD

G

TYPE OF MATERIAL MOST RESPONSIBLE FOR FIRE SPREAD	FORM OF MATERIAL MOST RESPONSIBLE FOR FIRE SPREAD	ACT OR OMISSION MOST RESPONSIBLE FOR FIRE SPREAD

H

ESTIMATED LOSS STRUCTURE	CONTENTS	OTHER	CASUALTY	F.P.O.	POLICE

I

PROBABLE CAUSE

J

MOBILE PROPERTY YEAR	MAKE	MODEL	SERIAL NO.	LICENSE NO.

COMPLETE FOR EACH UNIT RESPONDING

K

60	INCIDENT NO.	SUPP.	UNIT	ASSIGNED STATION	RESPONDED FROM	DISPOSITION	TRANSFER STATION NO.
	3404 46		E31	03	03	11 = IN SERV. W/RESP. ☐ 22 = NO SERV. ☐ 33 = SERV. REND. ☒ 44 = SERV. REFUSED ☐	33

L

UNIT OPERATION	PERSONNEL ON UNIT	PD.	VOL.	AT SC.	PD.	VOL.	AT ST.	PD.	VOL.
☐ 1 = NONE ☐ 2 = SEARCH/RESCUE ☒ 3 = EXTINGUISHMENT ☐ 4 = FIRST-AID/RESCUE ☐ 5 = INVESTIGATION ☐ 6 = VENTILATION/SALVAGE ☐ 7 = OTHER 3	ON UNIT	1	3		00	00		00	00

COMPLETE IF EQUIPMENT USED – FILL IN QUANTITY

M

61	HAND LINES BOOSTER	1 1/2"	2"	2 1/2"	3"	MASTER STREAMS	MASKS	FLOOD LIGHTS
	0	0	0	0	0	0	00	00

N

SUPPLY LINES 2 1/2"	3"	4"	OVER 4"	PUMPER PUMPED	LADDERS UNDER 30'	OVER 30'	AERIAL	GENERATORS	SMOKE EJECTORS
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

O

SALVAGE COVERS	PORTABLE PUMPS	POWER TOOLS	HAND TOOLS	FIRST/AID KITS
00	0	0	03	0

P

HEAVY RESCUE EQUIPMENT	LIGHT RESCUE EQUIPMENT	OTHER (SPECIFY)
0	0	00

WILL OTHER STATIONS REPORT? ☐

Z

UNIT COMMANDER	INCIDENT COMMANDER
Sgt Levy	Chief 8-2

FS-100 (REV. 3/91)

STATION COPY

E31

INCIDENT NO.	SUPP.
34046	

REMARKS: EXPLOSION

To Staging Area — To Side 3/4 to provide sorvey, precautionary hand line — monitor conditions — take up - return to service

PERSONNEL

	PAID				VOLUNTEER			
	NAME	DRIVER	ON CALL	TO STA.	NAME	DRIVER	ON CALL	TO STA.
1.	Will	X			Levy (OIC)		X	
2.					Smith		X	
3.					Toudeau		X	
4.								
5.								
6.								
7.								
8.								
9.								
10.								

FS-100

FIRE INCIDENT REPORT

Montgomery County - Fire/Rescue Services

COMPLETED BY FIRST DUE UNIT ONLY

A

INCIDENT NO.	TIME	DATE	STATION RUN NO.	
50 3406	OUT: 2335 IN:	6-15-93	F-	CHANGE ☐ DELETE ☐

B

INCIDENT TYPE	ACTION TAKEN	OCCUPANT
11	3	Giant Food

C

ADDRESS - LOCATION	CITY
19211 Mathkins Mill Rd.	

D

FIRST DUE UNIT	DISTRICT	PROPERTY CLASSIFICATION	COMPLEX	INDIVIDUAL
E81	08		51	511

LOCATION INFORMATION

COMPLETE IF FIRE – INCIDENT COMMANDER

E

LEVEL OF ORIGIN	AREA OF ORIGIN	EQUIPMENT INVOLVED AS SOURCE OF IGNITION	FORM OF HEAT OF IGNITION
52			

F

TYPE OF MATERIAL IGNITED	FORM OF MATERIAL IGNITED	ACT OR OMISSION ORIGIN OF FIRE	MAIN AVENUES OF FIRE SPREAD

G

TYPE OF MATERIAL MOST RESPONSIBLE FOR FIRE SPREAD	FORM OF MATERIAL MOST RESPONSIBLE FOR FIRE SPREAD	ACT OR OMISSION MOST RESPONSIBLE FOR FIRE SPREAD

H

ESTIMATED LOSS			CASUALTY	F.P.O.	POLICE
STRUCTURE	CONTENTS	OTHER			

I

PROBABLE CAUSE

J

MOBILE PROPERTY	MAKE	MODEL	SERIAL NO.	LICENSE NO.
YEAR				

FIRE INFORMATION

COMPLETE FOR EACH UNIT RESPONDING

K

INCIDENT NO.	SUPP.	UNIT	ASSIGNED STATION	RESPONDED FROM	DISPOSITION	TRANSFER STATION NO.
60 3406		E171	17	19	☐ 11 = IN SERV. W/RESP. ☐ 22 = NO SERV. ☑ 33 = SERV. REND. ☐ 44 = SERV. REFUSED	33

L

UNIT OPERATION	PERSONNEL ON UNIT									
☐ 1 = NONE ☐ 4 = FIRST-AID/RESCUE ☐ 7 = OTHER ☐ 2 = SEARCH/RESCUE ☐ 5 = INVESTIGATION ☑ 3 = EXTINGUISHMENT ☐ 6 = VENTILATION/SALVAGE 3		PD.	VOL.	AT SC.	PD.	VOL.	AT ST.	PD.	VOL.
	ON UNIT	22	22		00	00		00	00

UNIT INFO

COMPLETE IF EQUIPMENT USED – FILL IN QUANTITY

M

HAND LINES						MASTER STREAMS	MASKS	FLOOD LIGHTS
BOOSTER	1 ½"	2"	2 ½"	3"				
							03	

N

SUPPLY LINES					PUMPER PUMPED	LADDERS			GENERATORS	SMOKE EJECTORS
2 ½"	3"		4"	OVER 4"		UNDER 30'	OVER 30'	AERIAL		
	✓	350'								1

O

SALVAGE COVERS	PORTABLE PUMPS	POWER TOOLS	HAND TOOLS	FIRST/AID KITS
			03	

P

HEAVY RESCUE EQUIPMENT	LIGHT RESCUE EQUIPMENT	OTHER (SPECIFY)

EQUIPMENT INFO

WILL OTHER STATIONS REPORT? ☑

Z

UNIT COMMANDER	INCIDENT COMMANDER
MFF Williams	Command 8

SIGNATURE

FS-100 (REV. 3/91)

STATION COPY

INCIDENT NO. 3141016 | SUPP.

REMARKS:

Responded to Fill Box assignment f/Gas leak w/fire at Giant Food on Watkins Mill Rd. As fourth due engine we were advised to pick up E-291's line on side one. E-291 had not layed out so we reverse layed from E-291 to to hydrant at corner of Side 1&2 of bldg. After hooking up driver stayed w/E171 and crew reported to command 8. Ordered to take PPV fan from T-8 to side 4 and placed in operation. Returned to Comm. 8 and crew staged behind RS-9 on side 1. Shortly after staging a major explosion took place in quadrants C & D of bldg. complex. After assisting w/evac of personnel on side one repaired back to Comm. 8 and staged in a safe area. E-171 & crew held on stand-by at incident until relieved by a replacement crew @ approx. 0645.

PERSONNEL

PAID

NAME	DRIVER	ON CALL	TO STA.
1. Williams		X	
2. Hineman	X	X	
3.			
4.			
5.			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			

VOLUNTEER

NAME	DRIVER	ON CALL	TO STA.
Burns		X	
Shaw (cadet)			

FS-100

Department of Fire and Rescue Services
Bureau of Operations
District II

July 9, 1993

To: Chief James Magruder
Gaithersburg-Washington Grove Fire Department

From: Capt. Roger W. Strock
Senior Career Officer

Subject: Post Incident Analysis

As required by Fire and Rescue Commission regulation number 58-89, this is the post incident analysis of the fire and explosion which occurred on the morning of June 16, 1993 at 19211 Watkins Mill Road. A chronological outline of this incident is contained in the attached memorandum of June 21, 1993 to A/C McLaughlin which was developed from my notes of June 16, 1993.

The following text will cover the areas required in the Commission regulation.

When the explosion occurred at 0038 hours on June 16th, seven firefighters received minor injuries ranging from a minor laceration to the neck, that required no treatment, to a fractured rib. Actions that can be taken to avoid injuries in this type of situation will be covered in the recommendation section. Appropriate SOPs and safety regulations were being followed, but some actions did occur that will need to be corrected in future gas incidents. They will be covered later in this report.

Welfare of the fire/rescue personnel was handled by the following actions. Before the explosion, a rehab area was established on side 1 in the parking lot. The crew from A88, which had established an aid station on side 1, had prepared a water cooler full of squencher, and was about to lay out a salvage cover for personnel to rest on. After the explosion, a canteen was requested at 0108 hours. Unfortunately, Canteen 3 was the first one available to respond, and arrived at approximately 0300 hours. The weather was clear and cool, so shelter was not needed. A rehab area was established near the command bus, and A289 handled this area. Port-a-potties were requested and arrived before daybreak. The crews were rotated on a regular basis, and fatigue did not become a factor.

The major construction design problem was the fact that an underground utility trench connected the Giant Food Store to the Grape and Grain Store which was the closest exposure on side 4. It has been reported to me that this trench was approximately 3' x 3', and contained gas, water, and electrical pipes and conduits. This trench was from the rear storage area of the Giant's maintenance room and opened up into the rear closet of the Grape and Grain. Gas was apparently traveling through this trench, entering the closet of the Grape and Grain, and then following the pipes and conduit into the cockloft through the unprotected ceiling. This underground trench was not shown on the site plan, there was no preplan on this structure, and unfortunately no crews discovered it while repeatedly checking the Giant or Grape and Grain stores.

There were no access problems that hampered incident activities to any extent. The Giant was open when the adapted response arrived, and was quickly evacuated. Other stores in the immediate area were closed. There were reportedly many teenagers on the scene when the operation started, but they were kept out of the danger area and no civilians, except the two gas company employees, were injured.

Water supply was not a problem. Sufficient hydrants were available, and each attack engine was supplied by a pumper on a hydrant. Very little water was needed before the explosion, and only a very small area of fire was visible after the explosion. This was extinguished by the sprinkler system in the Grape and Grain, which opened during the explosion, before fire department action was needed.

It is my belief that fire department personnel were used effectively on this incident. However, there is always room to improve, and I'll make recommendations later in the report.

Support for fire department operations, and the investigation, were requested and received. The gas company and Pepco were called and did respond. The Fire Marshall's office requested the ATF National Response Team which quickly responded. At the writing of this report, this incident is considered an arson and still actively being investigated.

DFRS personnel also responded to assist. A/C McLaughlin (Chief 200), A/C Fitch, Capt. Mulhall, Lt. Rooney, and the two Division Schedulers arrived and assisted at the Command Post, and immediately initiated the Injury Investigation Team. The command bus was requested and arrived with police support and a crew from Station 26 which handled administrative and communication functions in the bus.

Chaplain Cummins responded and assisted with the injured and provided needed support to personnel from the first alarm companies. Capt. Bickham responded and started the Critical Incident Debriefing process. He later provided a defusing session at Station 8 on June 18, 1993 for C shift, and set up a critical incident debriefing for those involved on the evening of June 21st. D/C Adams responded to the scene and represented the Department.

The officers on the adapted response did request and receive additional apparatus when it became clear what they were initially facing. The box alarm assignment was dispatched and was believed sufficient for the incident based on the available information at the time. After the explosion, a second alarm was requested and provided enough manpower for all functions.

Communications were a problem on this incident. When an alternate channel was requested we were given channel 3. Channel 1 was assigned to an incident in Rockville. Extensive problems were noted using channel 3. Apparently without repeater capabilities, ECC had problems copying transmissions. A review of the tape showed many instances when units were asked to repeat messages or the transmissions were completely unreadable. ECC notified Command 8 twice during the incident that they were having trouble receiving our transmissions. The second time was just after the explosion when communications were the most critical. Fortunately, ECC was able to switch the incident to Channel 1 at that time, but that caused some confusion as units attempted to switch over at the most inopportune time.

Proper communication procedures were used by all units throughout the incident. ECC and operating units should be commended for the radio discipline and the manner in which they handled the communication difficulties.

As was discussed earlier, there was a site plan of the shopping complex and it was used throughout the incident.

There was no preplan of this structure or the exposures. We will have to review our development of preplans, and possibly change our priorities.

To the best of my knowledge, there is no SOP specifically for gas leaks, but units did follow the box alarm procedure. As units responded they were notified that E81 and E281 had taken rear positions and had laid a supply line. E291 was directed to lay a line on side 1, and this line was supplied by E171 on the hydrant. T29 was directed to take the corner of sides 1 and 2, and laddered the roof to ventilate. Other units dispersed on side 1, which was appropriate but we were too close. I'll expand on that thought in the recommendation section. The basic positioning of units was sound, and the crews did perform the correct functions for each type of company. Free lancing was not observed by Command.

The organization of the fireground followed the intent of the Incident Command System. When the officer on T8 asked for the box, he also requested an alternate channel. As soon as I arrived, Command 8 was established. D/C Michael Dmuuchowski arrived next and was assigned command of sector 3. Chief May arrived next on the scene and set up the command post for me. He remained there and was extremely valuable for the smooth operation of the command post. A/C McHenry arrived a short time later and assisted in many collateral assignments. I wore a vest, and later in the incident the safety officer wore a vest. Other vests were available but not used. Command post operations were transferred into the command bus when it arrived. At that time, in accordance with IECS, I transferred command to Chief May and continued to work with him throughout the night.

The fire ground was organized, and recorded by use of the incident command boards. Chief May kept records on the boards of assigned tasks and numbers of personnel in each company. This information was invaluable as we accounted for crews after the explosion, with this process being completed in under five minutes.

The strategy was to stop the flow of gas and ventilate the buildings as quickly as practical. This was not possible as the leak was before any above ground shut offs. The gas company had difficulty when they arrived as the appropriate shut off was apparently buried in an island in the parking lot of side 1. In retrospect, some would argue that positive pressure ventilation was not the most

appropriate tactic. However, the roof had been safely opened, the fans were placed back from the ground level openings and were not in the gas cloud, ceiling tiles had been displaced in the Giant, and the operation was successful in that store.

In the opinion of this writer, the overall operation on this incident was good, but obviously not perfect. The following is a list of recommendations that I have prepared:

1. In complicated operations, sectoring needs to be extensively used. Establish the safety sector as soon as possible, and continue to expand the command staff as required.
2. When positioning apparatus on gas leaks consider the following:
    a. Position on corners as the structure should be more resistant to collapse at that location.
    b. Position at least 100 feet from blank walls, and 150 feet from glass store fronts, if possible.
    c. If apparatus must be near the structure, park in front of masonry walls instead of glass.
    d. Be sure the command post is removed as far as possible from the scene for safety and for quieter conditions.
    e. Be sure ambulances and rescue squads don't move closer to the scene than necessary.
3. Verify that all utility companies are enroute, and continue to check on those that have not reported to the command post. Also, be cognizant of the number of utility workers operating on the scene and their location.
4. During gas leak operations, all exposures must be properly checked. This includes all rooms, void spaces, and particularly the cocklofts.
5. Accurate personnel accountability is a must. A county wide system must be put into place immediately.
6. The number of personnel operating in the danger area must be limited, strictly supervised, and monitored at all times. Others must remain at a safe location.
7. All officers must enforce protective clothing requirements at all times.

8. Crews that are resting should be removed to a safe and quiet location, where they can remove protective clothing and relax.
9. Officers must ensure that all orders are explicitly understood.
10. Onlookers need to be contained as far back from the scene as possible by the police.
11. On complicated incidents, get a police liaison in the command post as soon as practical.
12. A repeater system for channel 3 is probably needed.
13. If gas can not be controlled quickly, immediately consider evacuation by all personnel.
14. Be sure that someone is recording activity on a incident control board and knows the location of all crews.
15. The incident commander should stay off the radio as much as possible and have an aid make the transmissions.
16. Refresher training is needed on the Incident Command System. Some of the finer points are forgotten as they are not reviewed on a regular basis. For example, if a staging officer is not assigned, the first primary unit officer to arrive at the staging area will automatically become the staging officer.

This concludes my analysis of this incident. Should you have any questions or concerns, please contact me at your convenience.

CC: D/C Leslie Adams
A/C William McLaughlin
File

M E M O R A N D U M

DEPARTMENT OF FIRE AND RESCUE SERVICES
OPERATIONS BUREAU

AUGUST 26, 1993

TO: Jon C. Grover, Director
Department of Fire and Rescue Services

VIA: Deputy Chief Leslie D. Adams
Bureau of Operations

FROM: Assistant Chief Wm. Dennis McLaughlin
Bureau of Operations - District II

SUBJECT: Report of Injury Investigation Team
Watkins Mill Road Gas Explosion

Enclosed is the report of the Injury Investigation Team (IIT) on the gas explosion on Watkins Mill Road which injured nine people. The appendices are not included at this time as they are voluminous.

The IIT believes that there are several improvements that can be made to make operations on such incidents safer for all personnel in the future. A list of recommendations is included in the report. Some of them are items which will require follow-up by the Chief's Committee.

The IIT was formed shortly after the explosion by Deputy Chief Adams. It was composed of several DFRS officers, a representative of the union as well as a volunteer officer from the Gaithersburg Fire Department. All members participated actively as a team.

If you desire any further information or elaboration on the items cited in the report, please contact me.

Injury Investigation Team

Report

&

Recommendations

Natural Gas Explosion

Watkins Mill Road
Gaithersburg

Wednesday, June 16, 1993

Nine Injured

INJURY INVESTIGATION REPORT

Introduction

On the morning of Wednesday, June 16, 1993 at approximately 0030 hours, a violent explosion of confined natural gas vapors in several stores in the 19200 block of Watkins Mill Road injured nine persons; two volunteer fire and rescue personnel, five employees of the Department of Fire and Rescue Services (DFRS) and two employees of the Washington Gas Company (WG). Three businesses were very heavily damaged by the explosion.

This report is not intended to address the cause of the explosion as it is under investigation by the Montgomery County Division of Fire Investigations and the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms.

In accordance with Department of Fire and Rescue Services Policy and Procedure # 812, Deputy Chief Leslie Adams initiated actions on the scene to form an Injury Investigation Team to report to the Director on this incident.

The Incident:

At 2311 hours on June 15, 1993 Engines 81, 281 and Truck 8 were dispatched for an odor of gas in the Giant Store located at 19211 Watkins Mill Road in Gaithersburg. Upon arrival, personnel detected a strong odor in the store, ordered an evacuation of civilians from the store and requested a full box alarm at that location. Shortly after arrival, a gas fed fire was discovered on the exterior, Side 4 of the building.

At 2335 hours Box 8-4 was dispatched. the additional units responding were Engines 291 and 171, Truck 29, Rescue Squad 9, ambulance 88, Duty 8, Chief 29, Chief 29-1, FMs 50 & 51 and Chief 8-2.

At approximately 2340 hours, Command 8 was established on Side 1 of the Giant Store (See detailed map showing the affected part of the shopping center). An alternate channel was requested for operations. Channel 3 was assigned.

Chiefs 29 and 29-1 arrived shortly thereafter on Side 1. Chief 29 immediately began to set up a command post to assist Duty 8 (Captain Strock). Chief 29-1 (Deputy Chief Dmuchowski) was assigned Sector 3. Ambulance 88 set up an aid station near the

Command Post. The Incident Commander, EMS and Safety Sector Officers were using command vests.

At this point, it was known that there was a strong odor of gas in the Giant Store and that a small, gas fed fire was burning in the rear of the store. Engine 281 had layed a supply line to Side 3 from a hydrant supplied by Engine 81. Engine 281's crew had advanced a 1 1/2" hose line to the area of the fire to protect exposures while awaiting assistance from WG personnel. Truck 29 was ordered to open the roof scuttle holes on the Giant Store. That unit positioned at the corner of sides 1 & 2, laddered the building and opened a 3' X 3' scuttle and a 4' X 4' vent. Engine 291's crew advanced a hose line into the Giant Store - after finding no fire, they went outside. Engine 291 was positioned near the corner of Sides 1 & 4.

Meanwhile, a firefighter was directed to open the beer and wine store - exposure 4 from the Giant - to check for gas or fire extension. No fire or gas odor was detected.

WG personnel had not yet arrived. They were requested again and an ETA of 20 minutes was given. WG personnel arrived at approximately 0001 hours - nearly 50 minutes after the initial dispatch. It was noted by fire/rescue personnel that the WG personnel had difficulty locating street cut off valves for this location due to the fact that the store layout had changed over the years.

A rehab area was initially set up on the parking lot side of Rescue Squad 9 on Side 1 of the Giant store. After the explosion, the rehab area was relocated much further out in the parking lot on Side 1.

At approximately 0025 hours, personnel from Truck 29 and Rescue Squad 9 entered the Giant in full protective gear to displace ceiling tiles in an effort to clear the natural gas from above the suspended ceiling. Sector 3 continued to report that conditions on Side 3 had not changed during this time.

At approximately 0037 hours WG personnel apparently began to shut off the correct valve as Sector 3 reported that the fire was going out. Personnel on Side 3 later reported that as the flames died down, they heard whooshing, popping and rumbling sounds. They started to run as the explosion occurred. The explosion of gas in the areas above the ceilings in 19219, 19221 and 19223 Watkins Mill Road was massive. The walls, doors, windows, etc. were blown out by the explosion. Some witnesses said the roof rose 2-3 feet before settling down. Photos taken afterward seem to verify this.

Realizing the severity of the explosion, the Incident Commander requested a second alarm to stage in the parking lot. All efforts were made to locate, account for, treat and transport personnel directly affected by the explosion. The evacuation signal was sounded to get all personnel out of the immediate danger zone which included the following:

- 19211 Watkins Mill Road - Giant Food
- 19219 Watkins Mill Road - Schenks Hardware Store
- 19221 Watkins Mill Road - Fantasies Hair Salon
- 19223 Watkins Mill Road - Grape & Grain Beer & Wine Store
- Alley behind all stores -

Upon arrival on the scene, unit officers were requested to report the number of personnel on board each unit. This data was maintained at the Command Post. Using these numbers, attempts were made, with some difficulty, to quickly account for all personnel as quickly as possible. Without this information being gathered initially, the task of accounting for all personnel would have been almost impossible.

Some personnel interviewed stated that turnout gear without clear markings on the exterior inhibited quick identification of all personnel, particularly the injured, by rescue personnel unfamiliar with them by name and face. Officers stated that it is impossible to know the identity of all personnel with all of the new DFRS employees as well as the intermix of volunteer personnel. It was suggested that the name of each person be placed on a panel with reflective letters at the lower, back portion of the turnout coat. Fire and rescue personnel from the Germantown Vol. Fire Department did have reflective name panels on their coats. In addition, other articles of personal protective gear should be more clearly marked to enable identity after the fact. This was a definite problem faced by this IIT.

Communications on Channel 3 were unreadable from Sector 3 immediately after the explosion. After repeated attempts to establish the situation and extent of injuries in that Sector, ECC moved the incident communications to Channel 1. In addition, Command 8 sent Truck 29's crew to side 3 to size-up and report on the situation following the explosion.

During this time, most of the injured were exiting from Side 3 to Side 4 where they were triaged, treated and transported from. Command requested three additional BLS units, one ALS unit and relocated A88 to Side 4 where the EMS Sector was established by the paramedic Sergeant on Medic 89. Rescue Squad 9 was also assigned to the EMS Sector to assist with lighting and treatment. A list of all injured personnel is contained in Appendix B. The five DFRS personnel injured had an average of 20 years experience in field operations. The two volunteer personnel, both chief officers had an average of 18 years experience in field operations. According to one DFRS employee, one of the WG personnel advised those nearby that "It's going to blow" a second or two before the explosion. That did permit all involved to begin to move away.

Shortly after arrival of the 2nd alarm units and fearing another possible explosion in the Giant Store, all units were moved back in the parking lot to a point at least 250 feet from the buildings.

Field Comm 1 arrived and was set up on Side 1 in the parking lot. The command post was moved into Field Comm 1 and, in accordance with the IECS policy, Chief May assumed command. Duty 8 and Chief 29 continued to closely work together to handle the incident. Station 26 personnel with Montgomery County Police personnel (Officers Plitt and Burgess) set up communications for the Command Post.

A Rehab Sector was established near the Field Comm bus. Porta-potties were ordered by the Field Comm staff and placed at the edge of the parking lot. Fire Investigation Division personnel requested assistance from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms to assist with the investigation given the severity of the explosion and the amount of damage sustained.

Throughout the remainder of the night, adjoining stores were checked for any sign of gas migration. None was found except in the Giant store. PEPCO, WSSC and Washington Gas personnel assisted in isolating other stores as well as those involved.

Issues:

The IIT recognized several issues as a result of their examination of this incident. For the betterment of the fire and rescue service and in the interest of personnel safety, the identified issues are presented here.

1. There currently is no uniform Standard Operating Policy (SOP) for this type of incident. The IIT believes that the command personnel on this incident did an excellent job of command and control using standard ICS procedures. However, the IIT believes that a uniform policy providing a basic framework of operations on this type incident would improve the general level of awareness of all personnel involved in future incidents. In addition, such a policy would greatly improve the safety of all fire and rescue personnel.

2. To the extent possible, all departments should check pre-plans to verify location of utility shut offs. The site plan for this location was very good and greatly assisted the command post staff. It did not contain street valve shut off locations which the WG personnel had difficulty locating themselves. It was noted by some IIT members that some departments do not have even basic site plans or pre-plans of buildings in their areas.

3. On-scene communications on Channel 3, for unknown reasons, were very poor at times.

4. The IIT found it difficult or impossible to identify whose gear they had in their possession for inspection, post incident, due to poor or non-existent markings in some cases.

5. Officers, oftentimes, could not identify personnel in their Sector due to a general lack of clearly identifiable markings on turnout gear. It is recognized that officers may be familiar with those they work with daily but do not know all other DFRS and volunteer personnel. In contrast, the members of the Germantown Volunteer Fire Department have a their names on the lower back panel of their turnout coats in easily seen, reflective lettering. This type of easily identifiable marking would have made personnel accountability, on-scene personnel safety and identification by EMS personnel and officers much easier.

6. Gas detection equipment - there did not appear to be a lack of reliable detection equipment on the scene. However, the IIT believes that all primary units in the county should be checked to ensure that they are equipped with such equipment.

7. Sector officers fulfilled the initial duty as "Safety" for their sectors. Later in the incident, a command level officer from the G-WGVFD was designated the scene safety officer. Due to the size of the area to be covered, other officers were designated as "Safety" for specific areas. Sgt. Dallas Lipp, serving as "Safety" near the collapse zone on Side 3, post explosion, cited several concerns about entry into the danger zone without due regard for the role of the Safety Officer. Those concerns are contained in his report (See Appendix K)

8. No standard format of questions to be asked of the injured or involved personnel has been developed to date to provide uniformity of response for use by an IIT.

9. The rehab area was originally set up directly in front of the Giant Store (behind RS9). Rehab was moved approximately 250-300 feet back after the explosion. Although this type of explosion is rare, Rehab areas generally should be set up out of any potential danger zone. Vehicles should be kept a safe distance away to prevent exposure to exhaust gasses. In this incident, porta-potties and a canteen unit were brought in and properly placed near the relocated rehab area.

10. It was noted by the IIT that not all personnel had full protective gear in place when the explosion occurred. This probably was due to the fact the WG personnel were on the scene and cutting off the gas. In addition, units had been on the scene for over an hour - personnel had "relaxed" as they thought they were ready to go back to their stations.

11. The Command Post - staffed by Chief 29 and Duty 8 - did an outstanding job of keeping track of numbers of personnel per unit, location and activity of units, etc. It is very clear that during such incidents sufficient command post staff is necessary to control all necessary functions - various sectors, communications, accountability, strategy and tactics, command and control, etc. Consideration should also be given to Command Post security.

12. EMS Sector - Sergeant Crittenden of Medic 89 assumed the duties of EMS control officer - under her guidance, an outstanding job of triage, treatment, disposition, medical communications and patient follow-up was done on this incident.

13. Mr. Gene Cummins, Gaithersburg-Washington Grove Fire Department chaplain, reported to the scene and assisted with patient follow-up and reporting back to the IC staff. His role in this incident was very important to the injured personnel as well as those on scene.

Recommendations:

A list of recommendations developed by the IIT is provided to address areas the team believes warrant possible action. It is recognized that the Director may have to pass some of these recommendations on to the Chief's Committee, the Fire and Rescue Commission or others for possible action. It is hoped that in the interest of the fire and rescue service and primarily the safety of all personnel, that the issues and recommendations cited are received, reviewed and acted upon in a positive manner.

1. Develop and implement a uniform, countywide SOP for "Gas Leak Emergencies" to include sections on:

   a. Proper placement of apparatus for safety/operations.

   b. Proper ventilation techniques to include:

      1. Use of smoke ejectors, PPV blowers, natural ventilation.

      2. Using natural openings - doors, vents, scuttles, etc.

      3. Opening voids for ventilation, detection

      4. Proper timing of ventilation

   c. Properties of natural gas, propane, etc.

   d. Personnel protection - turnout gear, SCBA, safe locations, etc.

   e. Circumstances that warrant consideration of or dictate evacuation

   f. Checking of exposures, voids such as false ceilings, etc., closets, pipe chases, etc. Presence of fire walls between exposures, etc.

   g. Determining/evaluating the level of hazard

   h. General safety precautions

   i. Personnel accountability, limiting possible exposure

   j. Proper use of detection equipment (See # 17 below)

2. Recommend that all departments check preplans to ensure that they include utility cutoffs, meters, etc. Where preplans do not exist, they should be developed as soon as possible. The IIT recommends that all departments be required to develop accurate, uniform site plans and pre-plans for complex structures and that they should be regularly updated.

3. Develop a standard format for inspection of personal protective equipment (PPE) and SCBA to conform with the needs of the IIT as specified in P & P 812. A draft form is contained in this package.

4. In such incidents where personnel are critically injured or several fire/rescue personnel are injured, a responsible person, preferably an EMS provider, should be designated to secure all PPE items used by the injured personnel for inspection by the IIT. SCBA bottle pressures of the injured should be noted immediately after the incident If possible, gear should be bagged and tagged.

5. Install reflective name panels on the lower, back portion of all turnout coats. To improve accountability, personnel safety and identification of personnel and gear during and after such an event, the IIT very strongly recommends that a program be initiated to install such an ID panel on gear as it is cleaned until all gear is completed. It was interesting to note that some volunteer corporations currently use this type marking which greatly improves the ability of unit and sector officers to easily identify personnel in their immediate area. In this incident, the officers as well as EMS personnel could easily identified those present, injured, etc. at a glance if all personnel both career and volunteer had such PPE markings.

6. Recommend that all Station Commanders very carefully verify that all gear is marked as required. Non-specific or non-existent gear markings made it difficult for the IIT to identify some PPE received.

7. Recommend that Station Officers have personnel don all protective gear to ensure that it fits properly and that personnel can readily move in their issued gear. Gear that does not fit properly, permitting rapid mobility, should be replaced.

8. The Bureau of Field Support Services should evaluate the reliability of Channel 3 communications for emergency incident use. This could be done by noting communications difficulties during field tests or future non-emergency uses of Channel 3. Several officers reported that Channel 3 did not provide a good, reliable communications media during this event. In fact, at one point all communications were moved to Channel 1 because of these difficulties.

9. Ensure that all primary units are equipped with gas detection equipment. For ease of operation, training and maintenance, the units in use should be similar in design. Perhaps the Chief's Committee should research this issue.

10. Recommend that consideration be given to using the third command officer responding on a box alarm as the Incident Safety Officer. The IIT realizes that only two command officers are dispatched but on most box alarms more than two respond. The third one could be identified as the one to handle "Safety" unless otherwise assigned.

11. A standard form with basic questions to be asked of involved personnel should be developed to complement P & P 812.

12. Rehab areas should be located in a safe, distant area away from potential hazards, vehicles, etc. A defined policy and procedure should be developed to cover Rehab.

13. Command Post staff should be expanded early to control all necessary functions (e.g. command and control, communications, unit and personnel accountability, etc.) On such large scale incidents, the IC should consider Command Post security.

14. Other involved agencies/companies, etc. should be requested to send a representative to the Command Post or designated location and have them remain until released. A problem occurred where the PEPCO rep showed up upon request (after some delay), turned off the power and then left. Later when it was discovered that his actions also removed power from other uninvolved buildings as well he had to be recalled - again a delay. Although the police were present, they did not have a representative at the Command Post until daylight (approx. six hours into the incident). Incident commanders should request that a police liaison officer report to the Command Post to coordinate with fire and rescue.

15. All hazard areas should be clearly and distinctly marked using a defined method. Officers and personnel should be cognizant of the methods used and enforce keeping all personnel out of such areas until deemed safe.

16. Procedures and criteria are needed for the selection of, use and training of gas leak detection equipment. Strong consideration should be given to the provision and use of standard gas leak instrumentation for primary emergency vehicles in the county.

17. Add additional procedures and detail to P & P 812 to cover -

- o Impoundment of PPE
- o Examination procedures for PPE
- o Data to be maintained on PPE
- o Standard format for basis of statements of involved and witnesses.
- o Consideration should be given to permitting the activation of an IIT periodically to review procedures and techniques of investigation, survey PPE, personnel accountability, etc.
- o Delineate requirements for notification of Maryland Occupational Safety and Health and/or the county's Risk Management Office after such events.

18. Current telephone lists for personnel and family contacts should be maintained on command units for all DFRS and corporation personnel. Note: DFRS has taken action to make this information available on the vehicles used by the schedulers. Corporation command vehicles should carry lists of contact numbers and addresses for all corporation personnel.

Injury Investigation Team

Shortly after the explosion occurred, Deputy Chief Leslie D. Adams appointed an IIT per DFRS Policy and Procedure #812. The Team was composed of:

Assistant Chief Wm. Dennis McLaughlin - Team Leader

Assistant Chief Monte L. Fitch - Co-Leader

Captain Dennis Urban - Gaithersburg-Washington Grove Fire Dept.

Lieutenant John Rooney - EMS Duty Officer

Firefighter/Rescuer Richard Hoye - Local 1664

Deputy Chief L. D. Adams - Operations Bureau Chief (ex-officio)