



**MONTGOMERY COUNTY FIRE AND RESCUE SERVICE  
POST INCIDENT ANALYSIS**

Date of Incident: March 14, 2007  
Incident No.: 07-025275  
Location: 11202 Kennilworth Ave, Garrett Park, MD  
Magnitude: 2<sup>nd</sup> Alarm House Fire

**Safety**

Were any fire/rescue personnel injured? No  
Could the injuries have been avoided? N/A  
Were all safety SOPs and regulations enforced? Yes

**Welfare**

Were fire/rescue personnel provided with food and drink? Yes, Canteen 5  
Was adequate shelter provided for fire/rescue personnel? None needed.  
Was dry clothing provided for fire/rescue personnel? No, not needed  
Were crews relieved by fresh crews on a regular and frequent basis? Yes, crews rotated on a regular basis.

**Building, Vehicle and Topography**

What construction or design features contributed to the spread of fire and smoke? Balloon framed construction did contribute to the spread of fire and smoke in the building.

Did the topography, type of fuel, characteristics or hazardous materials, affect control efforts? No

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**Access**

Did personnel or apparatus encounter any problems in gaining access? Yes to some degree due to street being narrow.

**Weather**

Did weather conditions contribute to the spread of fire, hazardous material, etc.? No, weather was very good.

Were fire/rescue personnel hampered in the performance of their duties? No.

Was access to the fire building or exposures limited? Yes on side B, however RS18 cut down wooden fence and 2 trees to gain access to that side of house.

**Suppression Agent Logistics**

Was the water [or other suppression agent] supply adequate? Yes

Were supplies, equipment, or materials needed and not provided in a timely manner? No.

**Personnel**

Were fire/rescue control personnel used effectively? Yes, good deployment and coordination of crews.

Were the proper support teams and agencies contacted? Yes, Investigations, PEPCo., WSSC and MCP all assisted.

Were these teams, agencies and personnel effective and responsive to Command? Yes, absolutely.

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**Apparatus**

Was the request for additional apparatus made in sufficient time to have a significant impact on mitigating the emergency? Yes, RID and TF upon arrival of BC4 and then 2<sup>nd</sup> Alarm shortly after.

Did the apparatus function effectively? Yes, with the exception of a throttle failure on E52 that was quickly corrected.

**Communications**

Was the fire ground channel adequate? Yes, Charlie for ops, Delta for staging and Re-hab.

Were the proper communications procedures followed? Yes.

Was there any problem communicating with apparatus outside of our jurisdiction?  
N/A

Was the communication network controlled to reduce confusion? Yes.

Did units, sectors, and Montgomery communicate effectively? Yes.

Were units, sectors and Montgomery available and receptive to Command communications? Yes.

**Pre-Emergency Planning**

Were the pre-fire or other plans needed on the scene? No.

Were they available on the scene? Yes, MDC maps for hydrant locations.  
Do they need to be updated? N/A

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**Standard Operating Procedures**

Were they used? Yes.

Were they adequate? Yes.

Do they need to be updated? No.

**Organization**

Was Command identified and maintained throughout the incident? Yes.

Communications? Yes.

Flags/Vests? Vests were used by division and section supervisors.

Was the fireground well organized? Yes, C5-3 with Side A Division and then Div. 1, RC2 with Side C Division, BC2 first as exterior side C safety then Div. 2 once interior operations commenced, Safety 1 with side A safety Div. then overall Safety as interior operations commenced, BC3 with Div. 3. EMS1 with EMS Group and Re-hab.

Were the sectors used appropriate to the type and complexity of the incident? Yes

Did the sector officers function effectively? Very well.

**Accountability**

Were actions taken to ensure personnel accountability? RIT assigned to perform accountability function then on scene PARs at 30 and then 50 minutes.

Was the status of units, sectors and support personnel maintained? Yes, done by CS1 at Command Post.

Feedback from all units and sectors was constant.

Was the incident continuously controlled and monitored? Yes, by Command.

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**Strategy and Tactics**

Were acceptable approaches and actions taken to control and resolve the emergency? Yes, due to heavy fire conditions on 2 floors, defensive operations with Blitz-fires at first to contain fire and for initial knock and then interior operations to mop up with handlines.

Did personnel, units, teams and officers execute tactics effectively? Yes, as directed by Command staff.

Were any training needs identified? Yes. The lack of overall initial size-up by first due engine officer caused her to initiate an attack with too small of an attack line. By not doing a circle check she did not realize that there was heavy fire showing on Side C and that the fire was extending throughout the first and second floors. In addition the first due engine operator failed to open the intake for his supply line before using all of his tank water which caused a momentary loss of water to the attack lines. These issues will be addressed this week.

**Overall Analysis of Operations**

Good/Bad; Why: Overall operations went very well, some small problems at first that were quickly corrected and actually had little impact on the incident. Overall the strategy and tactics and coordination of the command function did very well. The fire was contained in a timely fashion and there were no firefighter injuries. There was a significant delay in reporting the fire by the home owner, who fought the fire for several minutes, sustaining 2<sup>nd</sup> degree burns to 21% of his body. This delay allowed for the advanced stages of the fire in the building prior to our arrival. Additionally, the fact that the command officers arrived on the scene with the initial units was very beneficial since the coordination of the defensive attack began quickly. It was clear that that the initial crews were starting with an interior attack with only a 1 3/4" attack line, which in this case would have been very dangerous due to the extensive heavy fire conditions and that small of a line would not have controlled the fire or protected the firefighters. In addition, it had been announced that there were no rescues to be made. Command ordered the heavy stream, exterior attack.

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**Critique General Comments: (include here a breakdown of Command, including Sector officers):**

Command: BC4, C200 and CS1 as Command Staff at CP (Fire Chief Carr also at CP for a time)

Divisions during exterior operations: C5-3 as Side A, RC2 as Side C, BC2 as Side C Safety, Safety 1 as Side A Safety, EMS1 as EMS and Re-Hab. with A59, M20, M19, CT5, AIR33, RIT Leader and Accountability Officer was Capt. Boccabello with E261, AT18 and RS18, C17-5 as Staging Officer with 2<sup>nd</sup> Alarm units.

Divisions during interior operations: Same as above with the following changes, C5-3 as Division 1, BC2 as Division 2, BC3 as Division 3, Safety 1 as overall Safety.

Submitted by: Battalion Chief Michael T. Hamilton  
Battalion 4, "A" Shift