SECTION 1. Purpose:
To provide a framework for initial fire/rescue operations involving incidents in the METRO roadway.

SECTION 2. Applicability:
All personnel operating in METRO roadways in Montgomery County.

SECTION 3. Background:
METRO roadway incidents are inherently complex incidents because of the number of people potentially affected and the amount of inter-agency coordination that will be required.

The “crush load” of an 8-car train can be over 1,800 people which will include persons with disabilities and mobility issues who will need assistance if evacuation is necessary.

Position Statement
This appendix to the Incident Response Policy outlines the initial MCFRS response to incidents occurring in the METRO roadway and is based on incidents involving occupied trains stranded smoke-filled tunnels.

METRO incidents require decisive but careful action based on the early development of situational awareness and ongoing risk assessments. Ensuring effective and ongoing situational awareness
begins with observing the scene, including but not limited to, interviews of exiting passengers, visualizing the roadway and coordinating with the METRO Rail Operations Control Center (ROCC).

It is the intent of MCFRS that at the 20-minute mark we will have a comprehensive understanding of the nature and scope of the problem, that we will have established a coordinated effort with partner agencies, that we will have identified and begun to treat patients, and that we will have created a framework for incident expansion.

There are some key assumptions that guide the MCFRS thought process:

a. The METRO system is a hostile environment with many hazards for both occupants and fire/rescue personnel.

b. All METRO roadway incidents require close coordination with the ROCC or the Yard Interlocking Operator (YIO).

c. The ROCC will be the first responder for incidents in roadway. They will likely know about the incident before the fire department does. They will also have the most current and validated information about the incident status.

d. Passengers trapped in a stranded train will begin self-evacuating if left unattended. When they do, the hazards to the passengers and fire/rescue personnel increase and the number of options for managing the incident decrease. Every reasonable effort must be made to keep passengers on the train and informed.

e. Fires in the roadway will likely be small and nearly all of them can be controlled with a dry chemical fire extinguisher. While personnel must be prepared to deploy and flow handlines, developing situational awareness and quickly accessing the scene may take precedence over a fire attack with hose lines.

f. There will be multiple people requiring EMS care.

As conditions allow, initial operations should focus on quickly accessing the train to begin calming and reassuring the passengers. Whenever possible we want to prevent passengers from entering the roadway. However, if passengers do enter the roadway the fire department will support their evacuation. How the fire department supports self-evacuation is situation dependent but may include tasks such as directing people to exit points, illuminating travel paths and obstructions, posting guides along the egress route, using portable ladders or other tools to help people onto the platform, etc.

**General Approach**

There are four standard objectives for roadway incidents. Personnel should consider these objectives as a starting point and adjust as the situation demands. The four standard objectives are:
a. **Assess:** Begin the process of situational awareness by utilizing information provided at dispatch, during the response and upon arrival to determine the location and scope of the incident and establish initial incident objectives.

b. **Control:** In coordination with the ROCC, begin the process of controlling and removing hazards such as moving trains, 3rd rail power and smoke.

c. **Rescue:** Access the scene and begin the process of disentanglement, extrication and evacuation.

d. **Evacuate:** Evacuate and assist and passengers to an area of safety and begin to triage and treat the injured.

The initial MCFRS response is based on units operating as Task Forces (TF) with predesignated Task Force Leaders (TFL). The use of TF provides some added operationally flexibility and enhances the ability to rapidly and seamlessly expand the incident management system. Each TF has a basic set of objectives but only the Entry TF is expected to make initial entry into the roadway.

A portion of the initial response is used to establish a foundation for the emergency medical care of passengers. The EMS resources assigned to the initial response will be insufficient to manage a true mass casualty incident and are therefore focused on the identification and rapid transport of the sick and injured in accordance with EMS protocols.

In the absence of an immediate life hazard, it is important to ensure that all of the agencies and resources involved in a METRO incident are working with a common operational picture and towards the same objectives. It is important to build a solid framework for command, control, and coordination before units commit to the roadway.

**Coordination with METRO**

The ROCC Fire Liaison (RFL) is a position within the ROCC staffed by a uniformed fire department officer. The purpose of the RFL is to act as an intermediary between first responders and METRO supervisors while mitigating events from within the ROCC. In addition to a direct interface with the ROCC Assistant Superintendent, the RFL utilizes surveillance cameras, rail display mapping programs and internal communications to relay pertinent information to unit and/or chief officers responding to events within the METRO system. The RFL has the ability to provide real-time information regarding the status of train movement, third rail power, ventilation fans and the status of any passengers.

While station managers are a valuable resource for incidents occurring within a station structure, they should not be considered a reliable source of information for incidents occurring within the roadway. Except for incidents occurring within a yard, the ROCC should be considered the primary information resource for all incidents occurring within the roadway.
Single Unit Investigative Responses

A Single Unit Investigative Response is sent only for the purpose of investigating and confirming that there is no emergency or need for fire department intervention.

The unit officer will visualize the roadway without entering, ensure that there is no obvious emergency, confirm their findings with the RFL, and provide a radio return consistent with the Communications Appendix.

Minor Roadway Incidents

Minor roadway incidents are defined as insulator fires, tie fires, brush fires and other similar events. For these incidents, the initial alarm must follow the initial actions established in the policies and procedures to include establishing a water supply if appropriate, gathering information, coordinating with the ROCC, checking the third rail locally, and placing WSADs at both ends of the work area. The units will not form pre-designated TFs, but the aerial units will still act as safety control units.

Approach to Injured/Sick Persons in the Roadway

Injured/sick person incidents are defined as incidents where a person(s) has become injured or sick and they require fire department assistance in being removed from the roadway. For these incidents the initial alarm must follow the initial actions established in the policies and procedures. The units will not form pre-designated TFs however the aerial units will still act as safety control units.

Approach to Rail Yard Incidents

Rail Yard incidents are defined as incidents occurring within the rail yard or on a “lead track”. For these incidents the initial alarm must follow the initial actions established in the policies and procedures and ensure coordination with the Yard Interlocking Operator (YIO). The units will not form pre-designated TFs, but the aerial units will still act as safety control units. The Incident Commander must ensure coordination with the Yard Interlocking Operator.

Approach to Incident Command

In the early stages of a METRO incident, the Incident Commander will be faced with multiple time critical decisions and will be receiving information from multiple sources. It will be difficult to manage and coordinate that level of action. This appendix addresses those realities by creating predetermined Incident Management System (IMS) assignments at the TF level.

Starting the IMS structure at the TF level simplifies IMS expansion. The TF is the first level NIMS based grouping of incident resources. A working incident in the roadway is likely to expand. The predesignated TFs still have room to add units and multiple TFs can be placed under the control of a Division/Group Supervisor.
In addition to additional Certified Chief Officers (CCOs), the Incident Commander should expect METRO personnel and supervisors to arrive at the command post to assist with the mitigation efforts. The first METRO Transit Police officer or responsible rail supervisor to arrive at the scene will be designated by METRO as the On-Scene Commander (OSC). The OSC is an internal METRO identification that should not be confused with the Incident Commander (IC). The OSC will be expected to represent METRO within the Unified Command structure.

When available, and resources allow, MCFRS Rail Liaison Officers (RLOs) will also respond to the scene. RLOs are personnel who regularly train in all aspects of METRO and should be considered subject matter experts by the IC. The IC has the option to utilize RLOs in any fashion to assist in meeting established objectives. RLOs may be used in the command post, sent as forward observers or to assist with safety functions.

Incident Commanders must also consider the effects that the incident is having on the regional transportation system, specifically nearby stations. Preventing train movement on both tracks, while appropriate at times, creates the potential for significant overcrowding at other stations, which creates a risk of additional events. When feasible, and safe to do so, the IC should coordinate with METRO to allow for single-tracking around an incident to reduce the impact throughout the region.

SECTION 4. Definitions:
See Appendix Q.

SECTION 5. Policy:

a. Standard Response Plans

1. MET/FULL: The response plan for a reported fire or crash in the METRO roadway is six engines, three aerial units, one rescue squad, five EMS transport units, and four command officers.
   A. One engine and one aerial will be dispatched to the alternate entry point.
   B. At least two command officers must respond on the assignment.

2. For incidents requiring an alternate entry point, that alternate entry point will always be a METRO station unless the IC diverts units to a portal or yard.

3. MET/RESCUE: The response plan for any other event in the METRO roadway is three engines, two aerial units, one rescue squad, two EMS transport units, one ALS resource, and two command officers. At least one command officer must respond on the assignment.

4. MET/OTH: Reduced assignment for smoke events not involving a train (trash and insulator fires, etc.)
5. MET/INV: Single manpower unit response for incidents where METRO has notified the Emergency Communications Center of an event, but advises that fire department response is not needed.

b. Personnel must have a working knowledge of the Metrorail Emergency Services Manual and regularly train in all aspects of METRO.

c. The METRO "roadway" is defined as the area within the tunnel walls underground, between the fences at-grade, between the safety railings when on aerial structures and areas in the track areas of METRO Yards.

d. METRO roadways and yards must always be considered high hazard areas, regardless of the presence of smoke or fire. However, in the absence of smoke or fire, these areas should not automatically be considered an IDLH environment sufficient to require a standby or rapid intervention team.

e. An immediate life hazard is defined as a situation where personnel can either see or hear people in the roadway and third rail power has not been controlled.

f. Lookouts are personnel dedicated to looking for and reporting on hazards to personnel operating the in the roadway. This is generally used when personnel enter the roadway before all safety and control measures can be taken.

g. **Initial Actions**

1. The first arriving Primary Unit Officer will provide the Initial On-Scene report (IOSR).

2. The first arriving Primary Unit Officer will then:

   A. Contact the ROCC, preferably through the ROCC Fire Liaison on the tactical TalkGroup, to obtain the following incident critical information:

      i. Location of incident

      ii. Nature of the incident

      iii. Status of the passengers or other occupants

      iv. Smoke conditions

      v. Status of the third rail

      vi. Status of train movement

      vii. METRO’s current action plan.

      viii. Any specific intervention requested by METRO (*What does METRO need from the Fire Department?*)

A. The SUR contains the information gathered from the ROCC and direct observation, including the location of the incident, conditions found, actions taken or planned by METRO, the type of command, and other needs as applicable.

4. If the first arriving unit is an aerial unit or rescue squad, they should consider passing command at the earliest opportunity, preferably to the second due engine.

5. Units dispatched on a reduced assignment that arrive to find a reported occupied train in a smoke-filled tunnel must request the METRO box alarm.

h. Task Force Behavior

1. Each TF making entry into the roadway, except in the presence of an immediate life hazard, must consist of at least one engine and one aerial.

2. Units operating under a TFL must use face-to-face communications with their TFL whenever possible.

3. Radio traffic should be limited to LCAN reports or priority incident information from the TFLs.

4. TFLs must:
   A. Lead the TF.
   B. Ensure TF has clear objectives.
   C. Ensure TF accountability.
   D. Ensure TF is making progress towards the objectives.
   E. Manage TF work cycles to maximize completing objectives.

5. The initial Entry TF will, ideally, consist of the first and second due engines and the first due aerial. However, initial entry must not be delayed while waiting for a second engine.

6. When the first due engine and first due truck enter the roadway before the second due engine can join the TF, the second due engine must take a lookout position at the entry point, outside of the roadway, and await further instruction from the Incident Commander.

7. The role of the Entry TF is to make rapid access to the scene.
   A. They are expected to travel light and fast.
   B. They should only stop to provide lifesaving medical treatment, remove life threatening hazards, or to direct self-evacuating people to the exit point.
   C. Once the Entry TF makes it to the train they must enter the train, calm and reassure passengers (to keep them on the train), they must travel through the entire train, check for indications that people have left the train (such as open doors) and assess the roadway on the opposite side.

8. The role of the Support TF is to:
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A. Monitor the progress of the Entry TF
B. Gather a basic complement of supporting material and equipment
C. Gather and stage equipment based on the reports provided by the Entry TF
D. The TFL must ensure that personnel gather equipment appropriate for the incident based on the information provided by the Entry TF. For example, the Support TF should not be gathering spare SCBA cylinders when there is no smoke in the tunnel.

9. The EMS Task Force will remote stage and begin preparations for the timely treatment of patients and ensure clear paths of egress for transport units.

10. The Water Supply Company will remote stage and use available resources and information to determine which METRO water supply points will need to be supplied to support the incident.

11. The Alternate Entry TF will report to the next closest station from the incident, assess the situation there and report their findings to Command.

i. Incident Command and Coordination

1. METRO incidents will utilize a Unified Command structure to include Fire/Rescue, METRO Transit Police and/or the responsible METRO Rail Supervisor, and other stakeholder agencies.

2. The Incident Commander will be the fire department representative in the command post as determined by the Incident Command Appendix and the Integrated Emergency Command Structure.

3. The first Metro Transit Police officer or responsible Rail Supervisor to arrive at the scene will be the METRO On-Scene Commander representing WMATA.

4. The Incident Commander must apply the Incident Response Policy, the Operational Doctrine Statement, along with their education, training and experience to scale the operation as necessary to meet the established incident objectives.

5. Command Officers should consider requesting additional CCOs and assigning multiple assistant safety officers for significant incidents which will require extended operations.

6. A unit establishing Stationary Command will establish the command post in the most appropriate location based on the incident priorities and objectives and announce its location.

7. While the kiosk is a good resource to assist with size-up and risk assessment, it should generally not be used as a command post.

8. Aerial units will be used as safety control units and generally should not be placed in the command role.
9. When an engine establishes Tactical Command and they have to act on an immediate life hazard, they should pass the command to the second due engine if that engine is on the scene.

10. All METRO incidents must be coordinated with METRO by the following means based on the location:
   A. Incidents located within the METRO roadway must be coordinated with the ROCC.
   B. Incidents located inside a yard must be coordinated with the Yard Interlocking Operator, who is located inside the yard tower.
   C. Incidents occurring on a lead track must be closely coordinated with BOTH the ROCC and the Yard Interlocking Operator.

11. In order to ensure that critical messages are not missed, personnel and the Incident Commander should use radio communications whenever possible-including communications with the ROCC via the RFL.

12. Contacting the ROCC
   A. Any unit that contacts the ROCC must:
      i. Provide their name and rank;
      ii. Advise that they are representing the MCFRS; and
      iii. Provide their current location.

13. Contacting the ROCC should be made in the following priority order:
   A. Through the ROCC Fire Liaison (RFL) on the assigned tactical TalkGroup;
   B. Through the RFL by dialing “5-4404” from a wayside phone (usually in a BLB) or 301-955-4404 from a cell phone; and
   C. Directly to the ROCC Assistant Superintendent by dialing “2-1652” from a wayside phone or 202-962-1652 from a cell phone.

14. Personnel should avoid contacting the ROCC from a blue light box/emergency trip station (BLB/ETS) as doing so requires personnel to enter the roadway.

15. The Incident Commander must notify the ROCC if any fire protection systems are charged.

16. Where incidents occur within a shared corridor between METRO and CSX, the Incident Commander must ensure that all personnel remain clear of the heavy rail roadway until proper heavy rail train control procedures are established.

j. Entering the Roadway
   1. Units that arrive to a METRO incident and find no life safety hazard or immediate need for fire department intervention must not enter the roadway without following the established
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1. Safety procedures within this policy and without an escort by an authorized METRO supervisor.
2. For all roadway incidents the preferred method of entry is through an existing opening such as a station, portal or row gate.
3. Personnel must not enter the roadway, except to resolve an immediate life hazard until:
   A. There is a clear objective for entering the roadway;
   B. There is at least one other unit on the scene; and
   C. The third rail is confirmed down and tested locally;
4. The PPE for roadway incidents must be matched to the hazards. However, the minimum PPE for personnel operating in the roadway incident is duty shoes, long pants, traffic safety vest, work gloves, eye protection, and a helmet.
5. Personnel must not enter the roadway if there is:
   A. Sufficient smoke that a person cannot see their feet from a standing position.
   B. There is heat or smoke of sufficient intensity that personnel must crawl to travel.
6. Personnel must be alert to indications of non-typical incidents such as:
   A. On-going violence;
   B. Chemical releases;
   C. Explosive devices;
   D. The activation of multiple CB-EMIS chemical sensors; or
   E. The activation of a single chemical sensor with symptomatic patients.
7. Fire/Rescue personnel must not enter power substations, tie-breaker stations and electrical, communications or train control rooms without a METRO escort, unless there is a known life hazard. These rooms are generally areas which the standard METRO key set does not provide access.

k. Safety Control Units
1. The aerial units on the initial assignment will act as Safety Control Units (SCU). The SCUs have the following responsibilities:
   A. Ensure a high level of situational awareness;
   B. Ensure TF remains together;
   C. Maintain TF orientation to egress;
   D. Ensure checks of each new section of third rail.
   E. Ensure periodic checks of SCBA air level;
F. Secure train movement through the use of wheel chocks and/or ensure hand brakes are set;

G. Ensure WSADs are placed at both ends of the work area;

H. Chock (rail) switches if they are in the work area;

I. Ensure periodic accountability of TF personnel;

J. Monitor personnel for unsafe acts and signs of fatigue;

K. Notify TF leader when safety issues are encountered such as;
   i. Low air
   ii. Signs of chemical exposure
   iii. Trip hazards

I. Management of Third Rail

1. The third rail, the third rail cover and all train collector shoes must be treated as if they are energized at all times. This includes times after local testing and WSAD deployment.

2. The preferred method to control third rail power is for personnel to request removal of power through the ROCC or YIO. This action will allow time for the ROCC to safely position trains, which may be in the affected area before power removal. Personnel must not shut down third rail power locally using a BLB/ETS without consulting with the ROCC except to resolve an immediate life hazard.

3. Should personnel directly encounter an immediate life hazard and the status of third rail power is not immediately available, power may be removed by depressing the red emergency trip button located in the nearest BLB/ETS.
   A. Anytime personnel activate an emergency trip button the ROCC must be notified.
   B. Personnel should not depress the ETS buttons as a regular practice.
   C. There are no ETS buttons in Rail Yards

4. Upon entering the roadway, personnel must check each segment of the third rail locally with an approved testing device.

5. Once a work area is established, at least one WSAD must be placed on each end of the work area.
   A. A WSAD only provides a warning that the third rail is re-energized; it does not prevent the third rail from becoming energized.
   B. An activated WSAD requires immediate acknowledgement and action. The appropriate action will be dependent on the situation.
C. Additional WSADs must be placed between the work area and all ingress and egress points as soon as practical.

6. Caution must be used to account for areas with multiple sections of third rail, such as interlockings and areas where a train car bridges multiple sections of third rail.

7. For incidents which will require extended operations, the IC should request a “Red Tag” power removal through the ROCC.

8. During the initial stages of an incident, third rail power may be removed from an area larger than necessary. This will interrupt train movement and possibly lead to overcrowding in other stations.
   A. During these times, METRO may request that the IC allow power restoration to an adjacent track to allow for “single-tracking.”
   B. When safe to do so, the IC should grant a request allow single-tracking.

9. Before authorizing the restoration of third rail power, the Incident Commander must:
   A. Ensure the roadway is inspected to ensure that all Fire/Rescue and METRO personnel and equipment are clear of the roadway;
   B. Complete a PAR;
   C. Announce the intent to restore power on all operational TalkGroups; and
   D. Notify the ROCC and/or the METRO OSC in the command post that it is safe to restore power.

m. Lead Track Operations.
   1. The lead track is a section of track between the end of the revenue service and a yard.
   2. Both the Yard Interlocking Operator and the ROCC can control third rail power on the lead track.
   3. Units operating at or near lead tracks must coordinate third rail power management with both the Yard Interlocking Operator and the ROCC.

n. Tunnel Evacuation
   1. The preferred method of evacuating people from a tunnel is by train, either through the utilization of a rescue or recovery train.
   2. Evacuating people via the roadway should be considered a last resort.
   3. Rescue and recovery trains both require the use of third rail power.
   4. The roadway must be clear of all fire department personnel to utilize a rescue or recovery train.
5. When a roadway evacuation is required, the IC must closely coordinate the evacuation plan with the ROCC and follow proper third rail management procedures.

6. All roadway evacuations should be made to the closest station platform.

7. All personnel and evacuating passengers should walk in the track bed, in between the running rails, when in the roadway. The safety walk should be used only when traveling beside a stopped train.

8. The IC should consider assigning one or more units to monitor the evacuation route and identify obstructions using chemical light sticks or other available means.

9. When evacuations via a fan or vent shaft are required, sufficient resources must be available to collect and treat those evacuating.

10. When chemical light sticks or similar equipment are used in the roadway, they should only be used to mark the location of known roadway hazards, regardless of color.

SECTION 6. Responsibility:
All personnel.

SECTION 7. Procedure:
a. The first arriving Primary Unit Officer on the scene must:
   1. Visualize (assess) the roadway;
   2. Determine the presence of an immediate life hazard;
   3. If there is an immediate life hazard:
      A. [Declare radio silence.]
      B. [Announce the presence of an immediate life hazard.]
      C. Activate the nearest ETS.
      D. Designate a person to act as a lookout/safety.
      E. [Announce the number of personnel entering and objective].
      F. Withdraw from the roadway as soon as possible.
      G. [Announce when all personnel are clear of the roadway].
      H. Contact METRO to advise of ETS activation and situation.
      I. Then continue with the actions listed below.

b. First Due Engine
   1. Positioning
      A. Consider ingress and egress for EMS units.
2. Water Supply
   A. [Provide layout instructions while enroute to the scene];
   B. Initiate a water supply to the scene preferably using a forward lay;
   C. Connect to all available fire department connections; and
   D. [The driver must advise the Incident Commander when/if the fire protection system(s) have been charged.]

3. Tasks
   A. [Provide an IOSR];
   B. Assess the scene;
   C. Determine the presence of an immediate life hazard. If an immediate life hazard is present, take the appropriate action;
   D. [Provide a SUR (This includes command choice)]
   E. [Announce by radio when making entry.]
   F. Act as the Entry TF leader.
   G. Proceed to incident location to determine the scope of the incident.
      i. Only stop to take action that will have an immediate impact on life safety.
      ii. Calm and reassure passengers.
      iii. Ensure both side of the train are visualized.
   H. [Announce LCAN on conditions on the other side of the train.]
   I. [Announce by radio if it is not possible to get to the other side of the train]

4. Equipment
   A. METRO Keys
   B. Hot stick
   C. Fire extinguisher
   D. Trauma Care Kit
   E. Hand lights

5. Second Due Engine
   1. Positioning
      A. Do not impede ingress and egress for EMS units.
   2. Water Supply
A. Ensure the water supply for the first due engine.

3. Tasks
   A. Assemble with the first due engine and first due aerial to form the Entry TF.

4. Equipment
   A. METRO Keys
   B. Hot stick
   C. Fire extinguisher
   D. Trauma Care Kit
   E. Hand lights

d. Third Due Engine
   1. Positioning
      A. Do not impede ingress and egress for EMS units.
   2. Water Supply
      A. None
   3. Tasks
      A. The third due engine and the second due aerial will form the Support TF.
      B. The third due engine will be the Support TFL.
      C. Monitor reports from Entry TF and gather the appropriate equipment based on the nature of the event.
      D. Do not deploy without direct orders from Command.
   4. Equipment (minimum required)
      A. Standpipe packs (min 200’)
      B. Patient movers
      C. Trauma Care Kit

e. Fourth Due Engine
   1. Positioning
      A. Establish base staging for EMS units in an appropriate location.
   2. Tasks
      A. [Announce a staging location for EMS units while enroute to the call.]
B. The fourth due engine along with all EMS units on the initial alarm will assemble and form the EMS TF.

C. The fourth due engine will be the EMS TFL.
   i. Ensure EMS units are positioned for rapid transport.
   ii. Collect and stage patient movers from EMS units.
   iii. Initiate triage, treatment and transport as appropriate.
   iv. Determine and communicate scene and patient access routes.
   v. Request additional support from Command as needed.

f. Fifth Due Engine (Water Supply Company)
   1. Remote stage.
   2. Utilizing all available information, determine which remote water supply points provide standpipe coverage for the reported incident location.
   3. [Communicate remote water supply location to Command.]
   4. Report to remote water supply location when ordered to by Command.
   5. Request additional resources, via Command, as needed when more than one engine will be required to ensure remote water supply for the incident location.

g. Sixth Due Engine
   1. Positioning
      A. Do not impede ingress and egress for EMS units.
   2. Tasks
      A. Report to alternate entry point.
      B. [Report IOSR at Alternate Entry Point.]
      C. Visualize the roadway.
      D. Determine the presence of an immediate life hazard
         i. If there is a known immediate life hazard:
            ii. [Declare radio silence.]
            iii. [Announce the presence of an immediate life hazard.]
         iv. Activate the nearest ETS.
         v. Designate a person to act as a lookout/safety.
         vi. [Announce the number of personnel entering and objective].
vii. Withdraw from the roadway as soon as possible.

viii. [Announce when all personnel are clear of the roadway].

ix. Contact METRO to advise of ETS activation and situation.

E. Continue tasks listed below.

F. Be prepared to relocate the entire TF at the direction of Command.

G. Be prepared to take additional action on the orders of Command.

H. The sixth due engine will be the Alternate Entry TF leader.

h. First Due Aerial
   1. Positioning
      A. Do not impede ingress and egress for EMS units.
   2. Tasks
      A. Assemble with the first due engine to form the Entry TF.
      B. Act as the Entry TF safety control unit.
   3. Equipment
      A. Hot stick
      B. METRO keys
      C. WSAD
      D. Wheel Chocks
      E. Trauma Care Kit
      F. RIT Bag
      G. Portable floodlight

i. Second Due Aerial
   1. Positioning
      A. Do not impede ingress and egress for EMS units.
   2. Tasks
      A. Assemble with the third due engine to form the Support TF.
      B. Act as the Support TF safety control unit.
   3. Equipment
      A. Hot stick
B. WSAD
C. Wheel Chocks
D. Trauma Care Kit
E. RIT Bag
F. Portable floodlight
G. ETEC carts
H. 10 spare SCBA cylinders
I. Portable floodlight
J. Patient movers
K. Trauma Care Kit

j. Third Due Aerial
   1. Positioning
      A. Do not impede ingress and egress for EMS units.
   2. Tasks
      A. Act as the Alternate Entry TF safety control unit.
   3. Equipment
      A. Hot stick
      B. METRO keys
      C. WSAD
      D. Wheel Chocks
      E. Trauma Care Kit
      F. RIT Bag
      G. Portable floodlight

k. Rescue Squad
   1. Assist Support TF with gathering equipment. (but the Rescue Squad is not part of the Support TF)
   2. Monitor reports from Entry TF and be prepared to gather the appropriate equipment based on the nature of the event
   3. Be prepared to be redirected by Command
   4. Be prepared for rescue/extrication, including a plan to move rescue equipment and tools
I. All EMS Units
   1. Base stage as directed.
   2. Position for rapid egress.
   3. Units will become part of the EMS TF
   4. Follow direction of EMS TFL (fourth due engine)

SECTION 8. Cancellation:
Policy and Procedure 24-06 AM II, METRO Incident SOPs 1/20/2003
Directive 00-17 Revised, METRO Tunnel Communications Changes 08/14/2000
FCGO 12-08, Command Officer Response to ROCC, 04/12/2012
FCGO 15-11, Metro Investigation (MET/INVST) Call Type, 08/12/2015

SECTION 9. Attachments:
None.

Approved:

_____________________________  __________________________
Fire Chief                      June 1, 2019

Date